

The Notion of Awareness of Self-awareness in the *Cheng weishi lun*: Why Bother?

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In Xuanzang's (玄奘 602-664 C.E.) *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論 henceforth abbreviated as CWSL),¹ Dharmapāla (530-561 C.E.) has a fourfold division theory of consciousness/cognition: the part (or aspect) of perceiving (見分 *jian fen*, **darśanabhāga*), the part of perceived (相分 *xiang fen*, **nimittabhāga*), the part of self-awareness (自證分 *zi zheng fen*, **svasaṃvittibhāga*), and the part of awareness of self-awareness (證自證分 *zheng zi zheng fen*, **svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga*). In other words, in addition to Dignāga's (480-540 C.E.) three aspects of consciousness, i.e. the object-appearance (*viśayābhāsa*), the own-appearance/subject-appearance (*svābhāsa*) or apprehending aspect (*grāhakākāra*), and self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*, *svasaṃvedana*), Dharmapāla thinks that it is necessary to posit the notion of awareness of self-awareness if we analyze subtly. The notion is well-known in the East Asian Buddhist traditions through the works of Xuanzang and his disciples but not found so far in the Indian or Tibetan Buddhist traditions.² Iso Kern thinks that the fourfold division theory "very much deserves the attention of phenomenologists" (Kern 1988: 282) and dedicated his research paper to "the memory of Edmund Husserl." (Kern 1988: 293)

However, it seems redundant to posit the notion of awareness of self-awareness. For the phenomenologists, who emphasize the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and admit the reflexive self-awareness, which avoids generating an infinite regress, it is not necessary to posit an extra awareness of self-awareness. For those people who hold the higher-order theories of consciousness, which postulate that the first-order mental state's being conscious relies on the higher-order mental state and admit only the reflective or introspective form of self-consciousness but not the reflexive, it is also not necessary to posit an extra awareness of self-awareness

¹ CWSL is compiled and translated by Xuanzang from ten Indian commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* in 659 C.E.

² Neither is the notion found in Dharmapāla's own works such as *Cheng weishi baosheng lun* (Commentary on Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā*), *Dasheng guangbailun shilun* (Commentary on Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka*), and *Guan suoyuan lunshi* (Commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti*), which are extant only in Chinese translations. We are not sure whether or not the fourfold division theory of consciousness is indeed Dharmapāla's invention.

because they think that a second-order state needs not to be conscious to make a first-order state conscious and it would be question-begging to assume that a second-order state needs another higher-order state and so forth *ad infinitum*.

So why bother? Regarding the problem of infinite regress, is there space for a third way? This paper will offer an in-depth analysis of the relevant passages in CWSL with consultation of the pertinent Abhidharma sources. Hopefully this paper will contribute to understanding the *rationale* for the very notion and point out some issues that need to be addressed.

Arguments for the Part of Perceived and the Part of Perceiving

The arguments in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* (henceforth abbreviated as PS(V))³ can be summarized or reconstructed as follows. First, if the cognition of an object had only object-appearance or only subject-appearance, then the reflective cognition of that cognition would not be different from that cognition. However, those two cognitions are different. Therefore, the cognition of an object has both the object-appearance and the subject-appearance. Second, if the cognition of an object did not have the object-appearance, then the object of the preceding cognition would not appear in the succeeding cognition (or the later reflective cognition) when that object does not exist. Therefore, the cognition of an object has the object-appearance. Finally, in our memory of cognition, we remember both the cognition itself and its object, therefore, the cognition of an object has both the object-appearance and the subject-appearance (appearance of itself).⁴

In CWSL the arguments for the two parts are quite different. In particular, the factor of memory, which is important in Dignāga's arguments,⁵ is not mentioned at all. First, if the cognition did not have the object-appearance (the part of perceived), then either it would not be able to apprehend the objects of its own realm or it would be able to apprehend all kinds of objects since the objects of its own realm would be no different from others.⁶ Neither is acceptable. For example, the visual cognition is supposed to cognize colors, forms, etc., but if there were no appearance of those objects in the visual cognition, how could we say that the cognition can cognize its own objects? And if we admitted that the visual cognition can cognize colors, etc. even without any appearance of those objects, then why not admit that the visual cognition

³ Dignāga's points are not the primary concern in this paper. For more details, see Hattori 1968; Kellner 2010.

⁴ For more details, see Kellner 2010: 208-213; Hattori 1968: 29-30.

⁵ The factor of memory is crucial to the third argument, and pertinent to the first two arguments.

⁶ 《成唯識論》卷2：「若心、心所無所緣相，應不能緣自所緣境，或應一一能緣一切，自境如餘、餘如自故。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, a24-26)

The Chinese quotations in this paper are punctuated by the author.

can also cognize other kinds of objects, like sounds, tastes, etc. since those objects also not appear in/to the visual cognition? If there were no object-appearance in the cognition, then each kind of cognition either cannot cognize its own objects or can cognize all kinds of objects, neither of which is acceptable. Therefore, the cognition must have the object-appearance.

Second, if the cognition did not have the subject-appearance (the part of perceiving), then either it would not be able to apprehend any object, like the space, etc., which does not have the subject-appearance, or we would admit that the space, etc., is also able to apprehend objects⁷ if we admitted that the cognition without the subject-appearance is able to apprehend objects. Neither is acceptable because it is admitted that people can apprehend objects, but non-sentient beings cannot. Therefore, the cognition must have the subject-appearance.

The point of the first argument is that regarding the cognition, if there were no object-appearance, then there would be no distinction between different object-realms of cognitions. In Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti*,⁸ there are two criteria of *ālambana* (cognitive object).⁹ The first (C1) is that the object must be that which appears in/to the cognition. In other words, a sensory cognition arises with the appearance (*ābhāsa*) or form (*ākāra*) of the object.¹⁰ The second (C2) is that the object must be the cause or condition of its cognition. Of a cognition, there are causes or conditions, among which the object-condition is that meets C1. For example, a visual object is a condition which meets both C2 and C1, but a visual faculty only meets C2. Without C1 we cannot tell which is the object, not to mention the differences between object-realms.

The point of the second argument is that regarding the cognition, if there were no subject-appearance, then there would be no distinction between sentient beings and non-sentient beings. The subject-appearance or the apprehending aspect is something that only sentient beings can have, and it seems to me that it roughly expresses the idea that the intentionality or aboutness is a mark of the mental. Therefore, it is meaningless to talk about the *ālambana* not only for a stone but also

⁷ 《成唯識論》卷2：「若心、心所無能緣相，應不能緣，如虛空等；或虛空等亦是能緣。」 (CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, a26-27)

⁸ For an English translation of the Tibetan version, see Duckworth *et al.* 2016: 40-47.

⁹ Regarding the two criteria, there is a connection between Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti* and the ninth chapter of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*. See Kellner 2014: 278-283.

¹⁰ Not all schools would agree on this point. For example, the Saṃmitīyas think that the cognition directly grasps the object as the sun shines the light on the object or as the pliers grip the object. In that case one could say that at least the object appears *to* the cognition although not *in* the cognition.

for a mirror even though there can be images¹¹ or appearances in a mirror.¹² The implicit assumption is that only sentient beings' minds can be about the *ālambana*, or else there would be *ālambanas* for a mirror, a lake etc. We will come back to this point later.

Arguments for the Part of Self-awareness

The argument for self-awareness in Dignāga's PS(V) can be summarized as follows: If we have not experienced something before, we do not have the memory of it. That is, "one cannot remember what has not been experienced before." (Ho 2007: 225) But, as mentioned above, we can remember both the cognition itself and its object after our cognizing the object. Therefore, the cognition, as the object, must have been experienced if one can remember it.¹³ Then the question is how the cognition which can be remembered is experienced? If the cognition is experienced by another cognition (reflective cognition), as an object is experienced by a cognition which is different from that object, so that one can remember it later, then it would result in an infinite regress. Because there is also the memory of the reflective cognition, which implies that the reflective cognition is experienced by another cognition and so forth *ad infinitum*. Therefore, a cognition of an object is "brought to awareness by itself (*svasaṃvedyatā*)." (Kellner 2010: 210) In other words, a cognition is self-experienced or self-aware,¹⁴ that is, our consciousness of an object is also pre-reflectively conscious of itself.¹⁵

The first argument in CWSL is as follows:

"If this [part of self-awareness] did not exist, one would not remember [his] mind and its concomitants, just as one certainly cannot remember the object that has not been

¹¹ Note that the Dārṣāntikas think that the images in a mirror are not real because a mirror only reflect things which are external and not in the mirror. On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādins think that the images in a mirror are real because they can be the *ālambana* causing a cognition to arise. See 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》, CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 390, c3-16.

¹² Why a mirror or a lake, which can have images of things, cannot take things as objects? One possible response is given by Puguang, one of Xuanzang's disciples, that a mirror or a lake does not have an *ākāra* as the mode of grasping the object (*ālambana-grahaṇa-prakāra*). See 《俱舍論記》, CBETA, T41, no. 1821, p. 26, c29-p. 27, a10.

¹³ "If, however, Dignāga intends to establish self-awareness as an intrinsic feature of all mental states ..., then his argument based on memory is problematic, for strictly speaking it proves self-awareness only of cognitions that are or can be remembered." (Kellner 2010: 215)

¹⁴ Zahavi also interchangeably uses the terms "self-consciousness", "self-awareness", and "self-experience". (Zahavi 2005: 225 fn.8)

¹⁵ For the details of the argument, see Kellner 2010: 213-216; Hattori 1968: 30. For the rational reconstruction and discussion, see Ho 2007: 225-226.

experienced [by him] before.”¹⁶

Again, “one cannot remember what has not been experienced before.” (Ho 2007: 225) In fact, we can remember both the cognition itself and its object afterward. Therefore, the cognition, as the object, which can be remembered, must have been experienced. The part of self-awareness accounts for the experiencing of the cognition of an object, and one would not remember his experience of cognition without self-awareness. The first argument in CWSL and the first part of Dignāga’s argument seem alike,¹⁷ although the second part of Dignāga’s argument pertaining to the infinite regress is not mentioned here. The issue of infinite regress is mentioned and evaded in the analysis of the part of awareness of self-awareness discussed in the next section. It shows that Dharmapāla (or Xuanzang) is well aware that there is a problem of infinite regress if a cognition of an object is experienced by another cognition.

The second reason in CWSL: “because the object of measurement (*prameya*), the means of measurement (*pramāṇa*), and the result of measurement (*pramāṇaphala*) are different,”¹⁸ there must be three parts of cognition including the part of self-awareness. In the *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (成唯識論述記 henceforth abbreviated as CWSL-SJ), Kuiji’s (窺基 632-682 C.E.) notes on Xuanzang’s explanations of CWSL, the elaboration is that just as there are three parts when one measures something with a ruler, i.e. that thing is the object, the ruler is the means, and the knowing of the length is the result,¹⁹ so too there are three parts in our cognition of an object, i.e. the part of perceived as the object, the part of perceiving as the means, and the part of self-awareness as the result although there are no measuring acts. In short, there must be the result of our cognition, and that is self-awareness.

¹⁶ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「此若無者，應不自憶心、心所法，如不曾更境必不能憶故」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b7-9). Sharf’s translation of the last sentence is that “just as it is impossible to recollect things that never took place”, (Sharf 2016: 797) in which the Chinese character “更” is rendered in “took place”. It seems to me that the rendering is not correct and misses the point. See also 《佛地經論》卷 3：「《集量論》說，諸心、心法皆證自體，名為現量。若不爾者，如不曾見不應憶念」(CBETA, T26, no. 1530, p. 303, a26-27)

¹⁷ Compared with Dignāga’s argument, Yao thinks that “Dharmapāla reverses the order of the argument. Instead of inferring self-cognition from the phenomenon of memory, he insists that without self-cognition memories of previous mind or mental activities would be impossible. Therefore, self-cognition becomes a precondition of memory.” (Yao 2005: 146) However, Dignāga’s point is that “because there is no memory of an object-experience that has not been experienced, as [there is no] memory of color, etc. [that has not been experienced].” (*na hy ananubhūtārthavedanasmrī rūpādismṛtivat*, PS(V) 1.11d) This style, just like Dharmapāla’s, is *reductio* argument. If the cognition were not experienced, then there would be no memory of it. The implicit assumption: in fact, there is indeed the memory of cognition. Conclusion: The cognition must have been experienced.

¹⁸ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「所量、能量、量果別故」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b12-13)

¹⁹ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「述曰：相分、見分、自體三種，即所、能量、量果別也，如次配之。如以尺丈量於物時，物為所量，尺為能量，解數之智名為量果，心等量境類亦應然，故立三種」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 319, a25-29)

Third, “because [the part of] perceived and [the part of] perceiving must have a supporting substance,”²⁰ which is the part of self-awareness.²¹ According to CWSL-SJ, if there were no self-awareness as the thing or substance which the parts of perceived and perceiving rely on, then the two parts would be different substances, which implies that the part of perceived is separate from the part of perceiving, that is to say, the object would be external to the mind,²² which goes against the doctrine of consciousness-only. The two parts of perceived and perceiving “are not two independent things, but rather two ‘functions’ which are necessarily linked. As a duality they need a common base, a ‘tertium’, in which they are linked and of which they are functions.” (Kern 1988: 286) The part of self-awareness accounts for the inseparability of the two parts of perceived and perceiving. As the substance and common base, self-awareness is not separate from the two parts, therefore, those three parts are not separate. Note that the doctrine of consciousness-only is taken into consideration and the explication here seems for the insiders rather than for the outsiders, and concerns with speculative ontology, but not the phenomenological *epoché*.

Then the verse of PS 1.10 is cited in support of the last two points. “The object-appearance is the measured (the object of measurement); the apprehending-appearance (the apprehending aspect) and self-awareness are [respectively] the means of measurement and the result [of measurement]. With respect to the substance, these three are not separate.”²³ According to CWSL-SJ, because of the functional differences we say that there are three parts, and there must be the result or else it would be pointless to measure or cognize the object. But these three are not separate because there is only one consciousness, one substance, and the notion of consciousness-only means that nothing is separate from the consciousness.²⁴ That is Xuanzang-Kuiji’s interpretation of the verse, and in this way, the last two points also

²⁰ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「相、見必有所依體故」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b13)

²¹ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「相、見所依自體名事，即自證分。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b7)

²² 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「若無自證分，相、見二分無所依事故，即成別體，心外有境。今言有所依故，離心無境，即一體也。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 319, a29-b2); See also 《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 318, c11-17.

²³ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「似境相所量，能取相、自證，即能量及果，此三體無別」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b15-16)

The Sanskrit counterpart and its English translation:

yadābhāsam prameyaṃ tat pramāṇaphalate punaḥ / grāhakākārasaṃvittiyos trayam nātaḥ prthak kṛtam // (PS 1.10)

“The appearance [of object] is the object of valid cognition (the measured). Furthermore, the apprehending aspect and [self-]awareness are [respectively] the means of valid cognition (the means of measurement) and the result. Therefore, these three are not separate.”

²⁴ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「此頌意言，今此三種體是一識，不離識故說之為唯，功能各別故說言三。果是何義？成滿因義，見分緣相既為能量，能量無果，量境何益？如人量物起量解也。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 319, b4-8)

have the textual support. They study the structure of consciousness mainly by reasoning,²⁵ but not by phenomenological description, which we will also see in the next section.

Arguments for the Part of Awareness of Self-awareness

In CWSL it is argued that there is the fourth part of awareness of self-awareness if we analyze subtly.²⁶

“If this [part of awareness of self-awareness] did not exist, then what would cognize/experience the third part [i.e. self-awareness]? Since [the part of self-awareness] is equally as a part of mind [as the part of perceiving], it must also be cognized/experienced.”^{27,28}

According to CWSL-SJ, the inference is as the following Indian syllogism: the third part of mind must have a part of mind that illuminates it, because it is a part of mind, like the part of perceiving.²⁹ Just as there is the third part being aware of the second part, so too there is the fourth part being aware of the third part.

The question then arises: what is aware of the fourth part? Is there a fifth part and so forth *ad infinitum*? The response is that the third part is aware of the fourth, and just four parts in total will do. The second part has as its object only the first part, the third has as its object the second and also the fourth, and the fourth has its object only the third. It would be useless for the fourth to be aware of the second since the third is already aware of the second. Both the third and the fourth are genuine perception (*pratyakṣa*),³⁰ which is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*), hence they are non-conceptually aware of their objects. Furthermore, since the third and the fourth are aware of each other, there is no defect of infinite regress.³¹ With respect to the cognitive object, the relations between the four parts could be

²⁵ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「以理推徵，各有三分」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b12)

²⁶ See 《成唯識論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b17-18.

²⁷ The alternative rendering: “Since all parts of mind are alike, they all must be cognized/experienced.” The point does not change.

²⁸ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「此若無者，誰證第三？心分既同，應皆證故。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b18-19)

²⁹ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「量云：第三分心應有能照之心，心分攝故，猶如見分」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 319, b20-21)


³⁰ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「謂：第二分但緣第一，……，第三能緣第二、第四，證自證分唯緣第三、非第二者，以無用故。第三、第四皆現量攝。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b23-26)

See also 《成唯識論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 42, c23-25.

For a parallel passage, see 《佛地經論》，CBETA, T26, no. 1530, p. 303, b16-18.

³¹ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「故心、心所四分合成，具所、能緣，無無窮過。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b26-27); See also 《佛地經論》，CBETA, T26, no. 1530, p. 303, b18-20.

illustrated as follows (the arrows represent taking something as its object).




There is another reason for the part of awareness of self-awareness in CWSL.

“[If this part of awareness of self-awareness did not exist], then, again, the part of self-awareness would have no result. But all means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) necessarily have a result (*phala*).”³²

As mentioned previously, the part of perceiving is a means of cognition, of which the result is the part of self-awareness. But the part of self-awareness is also a means of cognition, hence it also has its own result, i.e. the part of awareness of self-awareness.³³ In other words, the third part is the result when the second has as its object the first, likewise, the fourth part is the result when the third has as its object the second.³⁴

The question then arises: what is the result when the fourth has as its object the third? Likewise, what is the result when the third has as its object the fourth? The response is that the object is also the result. That is, the third part is the result when the fourth is aware of the third, and the fourth part is the result when the third is aware of the fourth.³⁵ The third and the fourth are aware of each other and are mutually the results. With respect to the means and its result, the relations between the four parts could be illustrated as follows (the arrows represent taking something as its object).




³² 《成唯識論》卷 2：「又，自證分應無有果，諸能量者必有果故。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b19-20)

³³ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「述曰：見分為能量，第三為量果。若第三能量，立誰為量果？為量如前。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 319, b22-24)；「謂：第二分以第三為果，自為能量。第三緣見，以第四為果，能量可知。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 320, a5-7)

³⁴ Being the result of the means as cognizing an object and being aware of the means as cognizing an object are not substantially different, but only nominally different.

³⁵ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「〔第三〕緣第四時，以誰為果？……即以所緣第四為果，第四緣第三為果，例此同故。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 320, a7-10)



The way of thinking is quite systematic. The fourfold division theory of consciousness in CWSL, as Sharf pointed out, “resists the phenomenological reading”, and “Dharmapāla’s argument ... aligns him with a more traditional Abhidharma understanding of Yogācāra, in which cognition always requires a distinct object of knowledge.” (Sharf 2016: 798) In the next section, this issue will be further explored and other related questions will also be discussed.

Some Tentative Remarks

A knife cuts other things but not itself

Yao’s pioneering research (2005) shows that the issue of self-cognition or self-consciousness in Buddhism could be traced back to the early Abhidharma tradition before Dignāga. It could be said that the Mahāsāṃghikas’ idea of self-cognition is a reflexive model, for which that a lamp illuminates both itself and others can be used as a metaphor (simile). On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādins argue against the reflexive model and develop a reflective model, for which that a knife cuts other things but not itself can be used as a metaphor.³⁶

The basic point on the reflexive side is that when the Buddha’s consciousness knows that everything is impermanent or non-self, he must know everything, including the consciousness itself at that same moment. The Sarvāstivādins hold the exact opposite; they argue that a consciousness cannot cognize itself at the moment when cognizing other dharmas, though a succeeding consciousness can cognize its preceding one.³⁷ Why is reflexive self-cognition not possible? There are many arguments in the Sarvāstivāda texts. In Saṃghabhadra’s (fifth century C.E.) summary

³⁶ For the details of the Sarvāstivādins’ arguments, see Yao 2005: Ch.3. For a reconstruction of the reflective model, see Hu 2018. For the influence of the Sarvāstivāda on the early Yogācārins, see also Yao 2005: 124-125.

³⁷ Bhāvivēka, a sixth century Mādhyamika, has a similar point: “Omniscience cannot occur in a single moment, because a cognition cannot act on itself, like a sword-blade, and because there cannot be any self-cognition.” (Eckel 2008: 288)

and elaboration of those arguments, I think the following passage encapsulates his core argument:

“If [the condition] is absent, the dharma will not arise. If it is not absent, the dharma will arise, which establishes the condition as condition. It is never the case that a dharma lacks itself. Therefore, it is absurd to say that [a dharma] will not arise without the presence of itself.”³⁸ (Yao 2005, 52)

Based on the principle of dependent origination in Buddhism that everything arises in dependence upon others, the crux here is that no dharma is causally dependent on itself; therefore, reflexive self-cognition is not possible. There is no causal relation between a thing X and itself because “it is absurd to say that [a dharma] will not arise without the presence of itself.” And since reflexive self-cognition is a form of cognition,³⁹ which is causal, it entails that self-cognition is not possible because there is no causal relation between a cognition and itself. It is impossible for us to conceive that there is X without X, so there is no empirical meaning or content to claiming a causal relation between X and X. That is why Saṃghabhadra says that “it is never the case that a dharma lacks itself.” In short, the Sarvāstivādins argue against any kind of self-causation (self-cognition included) and stick to the anti-reflexivity principle.

One issue eventually needs to be addressed: how to avoid the result of infinite regress without conceding to self-causation or reflexivity? Regarding the solution, Master Yin Shun pointed out that the way of thinking in CWSL is similar to the Sarvāstivādins’ way. (Yin Shun 2005: 340) Take the four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) dharmas for example. The four characteristics are birth (*jāti*), continuance (*sthiti*), senescence (*jarā*), and desinence (*anityatā, vyaya*),⁴⁰ arising simultaneously with a conditioned dharma and “together enabling” that dharma “to exert its own activity (*kāritra*), or project its own effect.” (Cox 1995: 147) The characteristic of birth “draws out the conditioned factor [, i.e. conditioned dharma,] from the future and enables that factor to enter the present”, the continuance then enables that dharma “to project its own effect”, the senescence causes it “to deteriorate” or to transform, and the desinence functions for its “passing away”, i.e. “having no further activity.” (Cox 1995: 147) However, the problem is that since these four characteristics of birth, etc. themselves are also conditioned dharmas, each of

³⁸ 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 74：「隨有所關，法則不生；不關、便生，立為緣性。諸法無有關自體時，故畢竟無『關、不生』義。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 742, b4–5)

³⁹ It would be quite another story if one regards self-cognition as non-causal.


⁴⁰ See Cox 1995: 146ff, 305ff. Note that there is an issue on whether or not the characteristic of continuance should be included in the list. (Cox 1995: 146-147) Another issue is whether they are real entities or provisional designations. (Cox 1995: 148)

them, again, must be characterized by additional four characteristics of birth, etc., and so on *ad infinitum*.⁴¹ On the one hand, they have to stick to the anti-reflexivity principle; on the other hand, they have to evade the defect of infinite regress. The solution is that one conditioned dharma only needs four primary characteristics, birth, etc., and four secondary characteristics (*anulakṣaṇa*), the birth of birth (*jāti-jāti*), etc. Take the characteristic of birth for example:

“Birth among the primary characteristics is able to act as the proximate condition in producing the other eight factors with the exception of itself; because⁴² factors do not have the function of production with regard to themselves. The birth of birth among the secondary characteristics is able to act as the proximate condition in producing only that primary characteristic of birth among the nine factors.”⁴³ (Cox 1995: 310)

Each of the four primary characteristics serves as the coexistent cause (*sahabhū-hetu*) for the conditioned dharma, (Dhammajoti 2007: 206) and functions also for the other three primary characteristics, and the four secondary characteristics, *except itself*. Each of the secondary characteristics functions only for its own primary characteristic. Therefore, just one dharma and eight characteristics will do, and there is no defect of infinite regress. The anti-reflexivity principle is explicitly stated in the quote: “factors do not have the function ... with regard to themselves.” And the problem of infinite regress is avoided by the simultaneously mutual causation between the primary and secondary characteristics.

Take the characteristic of birth for example, and neglect the other three characteristics for the sake of convenience, the relations between a conditioned dharma and its primary characteristic (e.g. birth) and secondary characteristic (e.g. the birth of birth) could be illustrated as follows (the arrows represent the direction of causation).



It is obvious that the relations between the parts of mind (the grey area; the arrows


⁴¹ 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 13：「此生等相，既是有為，應更別有生等四相。若更有相，便致無窮，彼更有餘生等相故。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 405, c29-p. 406, a2); 「若爾本相，如所相法，一一應有四種隨相，此復各四展轉無窮。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 406, a21-23)

See Cox 1995: 308, 310; Yin Shun 1968: 239-240.

⁴² The word “because” (故) is added by me on the basis of the original Chinese text below.


⁴³ 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 13：「本相中生，除其自性，能為親緣，生餘八法。諸法於自體，無生等用故。隨相生為親緣用，於九法內，唯生本生。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 406, a27-29)

represent taking something as its object) are structurally similar to the above relations.



In addition to the structural similarity with respect to the way of thinking, is there any other textual evidence? As mentioned previously, the second reason for the fourth part in CWSL is that since the third part is also a means of cognition, like the second part, it must also have its own result, i.e. the fourth part. One objection is that the second part (perceiving) could be the result of the third part (self-awareness),⁴⁴ therefore, the fourth part is not needed. The response in CWSL is that the part of perceiving is sometimes not a valid means of cognition;⁴⁵ however, that which is aware of self-awareness, which is genuine perception (*pratyakṣa*), must also be genuine perception, hence the part of perceiving cannot be aware of self-awareness. In other words, the second part cannot be the result of the third part.⁴⁶ It is necessary to posit the fourth part.

Likewise, an opponent in CWSL-SJ explicitly suggests that just as it is not necessary to posit another characteristic of birth, i.e. the birth of the birth of birth, in addition to birth and the birth of birth for a conditioned dharma, so too it is not necessary to posit the fourth part if the second part has as its object the first and also the third.⁴⁷ This alternative idea can be illustrated as follows:



As said above, the second part cannot be the part being aware of self-awareness because it is sometimes not a valid means of cognition. The case of consciousness is

⁴⁴ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「彼若救云：第二見分為第三果」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 319, b25)

⁴⁵ Precisely speaking, the part of perceiving is sometimes valid means, sometimes invalid; sometimes perception, sometimes inference. See 《成唯識論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b23-24.

⁴⁶ 《成唯識論》卷 2：「不應見分是第三果，見分或時非量攝故，由此見分不證第三，證自體者必現量故。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b20-22); See also 《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 319, b28-c2.

⁴⁷ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「此中有難：如得及生，得得非得、生生非生，法不立第四得及生，何妨見分緣相及自證，不立第四分？」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 320, a27-29)

different from the birth of a conditioned dharma in respect of having something as cognitive object, therefore, it is necessary to take valid knowing into consideration.⁴⁸ Consequently, it is necessary to posit the fourth part and the way of thinking is similar as illustrated previously, in which the defect of infinite regress is avoided by simultaneously mutual causation or mutual cognizing.

It is interesting that Siderits, in his elaboration of Mokṣākaragupta's (1050-1292 C.E.) formulation of the argument for Dignāga's view, criticizes a similar idea. "The only way to avoid the regress is to have the original c1 [that cognizes blue, i.e. by which I perceive blue,] be the cognition that cognizes c2 [that is aware of c1]. But then we have two simultaneously existing things in a relation of mutual causal dependence. And this makes no sense. It would not be sensible to claim that the left horn of the cow is the cause of the right horn, and at the same time the right horn is the cause of the left."⁴⁹ (Siderits 2007: 226). The point is that there is no simultaneously mutual causation by which the defect of infinite regress is avoided. The criticism can be applied to the fourfold division theory in CWSL. Indeed, the Vijñānavādins, like the Sarvāstivādins, embrace the idea of coexistent cause (*sahabhū-hetu*),⁵⁰ which is "a doctrine of simultaneous causality." (Dhammajoti 2003: 48) For example, the Sarvāstivādins think that the resulting visual consciousness conditioned by the visual faculty and visual object arises with them simultaneously (at the same moment).

According to Dhammajoti's study, there are three types of *sahabhū-hetu*: 1. Two-way (reciprocal) causal relationship; 2. Co-nascent dharmas, being causally coordinated, give rise to a common effect simultaneously; 3. One-way causal relationship. (Dhammajoti 2003: 28, 46, 48; 2007: 206) The first type, which is the primary concern here, pertains to the dharmas being mutually effects, which can be illustrated via the example of tripod. (Dhammajoti 2003: 26-27) It is mutual causation "in the sense that the co-nascent dharma-s are reciprocally causes, reciprocally effects ... The very existence of one is necessarily dependent on the other." (Dhammajoti 2003: 28)

Regarding a similar criticism raised by the Sautrāntika: "Among two co-nascent

⁴⁸ 《成唯識論述記》卷3：「此不應然！此能緣慮有量定故，彼但成就、生長功能，非緣慮法，無量相違。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 320, b1-2)

⁴⁹ The passage discussed by Siderits: "Moreover, it cannot be right that consciousness and mental concomitant are illuminated by another cognition. For it is not possible for another simultaneously existing cognition to illuminate consciousness and mental concomitant, since there is no relation of supporting cause and effect [between simultaneously existing things], as with the left and right horns of a cow. Nor could it be illuminated by something existing at a distinct time, for since things are momentary, what is to be illuminated would not then exist." (Siderits 2007: 226) It is not clear whether the issue is simultaneously one-way causation or simultaneously *mutual* causation.

⁵⁰ See 《成唯識論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 9, b10-17; p. 10, a4-9; p. 19, b28-c10. See also Dhammajoti 2007: 203-206.

dharmas – as in the case of the two horns of an ox – one cannot prove legitimately which is the cause which is the effect,”⁵¹ (Dhammajoti 2003: 33) a possible response is that in the case of mutual causation, factors are both causes and effects.⁵² In the case of non-mutual causal relation, a more general response would be that in all cases, it depends on our causal explanation, i.e. from the causes we can explain the effects.⁵³ In any case, in the Indian tradition, the requirement to corroborate a causal relation between A (cause) and B (effect) is as follows: (i) if there is A, there is B; and (ii) if there is no A, there is no B;⁵⁴ it does not matter whether A precedes B or A occurs simultaneously with B.

However, according to Einstein’s theory, the speed of light in vacuum is constant and “no influence can propagate faster than the speed of light.” (Griffiths 2005: 422) Therefore, the contemporary thrust is that “the special theory of relativity forbids instantaneous action at a distance; no causal influence can be transmitted faster than the speed of light.”⁵⁵ (Huemer and Kovitz 2003: 558) Following this line of reasoning,

⁵¹ 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 15：「又俱生法，此果、此因，無定因證，如牛兩角。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 418, c25-26)

Contemporary philosophers ask a similar question: Suppose there are cases of simultaneous causation, how can we “determine which factors are causes and which are effects”? (Huemer and Kovitz 2003: 564)

⁵² See also 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 15：「又對法者，非許俱生互為果法，有決定量，謂此唯因、此唯是果。但許如是和合聚中，一切相望皆因、皆果，故不應責因果定因。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 420, a1-4)

⁵³ Immanuel Kant also discusses this question: “If I view as a cause a ball which impresses a hollow as it lies on a stuffed cushion, the cause is simultaneous with the effect. But I still distinguish the two through the time-relation of their dynamical connection. For if I lay the ball on the cushion, a hollow follows upon the previous flat smooth shape; but if (for any reason) there previously exists a hollow in the cushion, a leaden ball does not follow upon it.” (Kant 1933: A203/B248-9) Though Kant uses the time-relation to explain this, it seems determined by explanatory order as mentioned. Note that from different perspectives there could be different explanatory orders.

⁵⁴ For example, this is explicitly accepted by Saṃghabhadra as we can see from the above quote: “If [the condition] is absent, the dharma will not arise. If it is not absent, the dharma will arise, which establishes the condition as condition.”

This is also accepted by Dignāga. See 《觀所緣緣論》卷 1：「因明者說：若此與彼，有、無相隨，雖俱時生而亦得有因果相故」(CBETA, T31, no. 1624, p. 888, c24-26)

⁵⁵ Not everyone agrees on this. According to Bell’s theorem, “particles [governed by quantum laws] appear to remain ‘connected’ or ‘in communication’ no matter how distantly separated they may become. ... The particles communicate faster than light.” (Maudlin 2002: 2) In Bell’s own words, “the signal involved must propagate instantaneously.” (Bell 1964: 199)

Consider a simplified case that a neutral pi meson (pion in short), an elementary particle, is at rest first and then decays into an electron and positron flying in opposite directions. Those two particles neither spin up nor spin down before our measurement of any one of them, by the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, however, “if the electron is found to have spin up, the positron must have spin down, and vice versa.” (Griffiths 2005: 421) And it seems that the measurement of one influences the result of the measurement of the other one instantaneously no matter how far the distance between them is.

Is this correlation a kind of causation? Some would insist that “causal influences cannot propagate faster than light” though they admit that there is correlation or even some kind of non-causal influence. (Griffiths 2005: 428). On the other hand, some would say that this is a case that causal

Kistler asserts that “in each apparent case of simultaneous causation, it either turns out that the cause is not *strictly* simultaneous with the effect after all, or else that it is not a causal *relation*, in the sense that ‘the cause’ and ‘the effect’ constitute really only one event.” (Kistler 2006: 42) The instances of simultaneous causation in everyday life, like tripod, a lead ball on a cushion, seesaw, me sitting on a chair, etc., strictly speaking, are not simultaneous causation.

In Buddhism, a moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the smallest time unit, but it is not without duration. Like CPU’s clock, it is the smallest unit of time with duration, in which a causal event can occur,⁵⁶ thus, a cause and its effect may coexist simultaneously, i.e. at the same moment. Another point is that, from the perspective of perceiver or subjective experience, one cannot really differentiate time points between different parts of cognition at that same moment; furthermore, what one has is just the result of cognition that one is conscious of the object. The issue of simultaneous causation is beyond the scope of this paper but at least the above discussion shows that it is an issue that needs to be explored further.⁵⁷

Before the next subsection, here is a brief note on the issue of infinite regress. It seems that Dharmapāla (or Xuanzang-Kuiji) might side with the phenomenologists in respect of the problem of infinite regress for the reflective model, although his solution is different from the phenomenologists due to the anti-reflexivity principle. On the contrary, the higher-order theory of consciousness argues that a second-order state needs not to be conscious to make a first-order state conscious, therefore, there is no problem of infinite regress. (Lycan 2004, 96)⁵⁸ It would be question-begging to assume that a second-order state needs another higher-order state and so forth *ad infinitum*. On the other hand, the phenomenologists would question that how “the relation between two otherwise nonconscious processes can make one of them conscious.” (Zahavi 2005: 25) Furthermore, the higher-order theory could not “account for the *mineness* of the first-order state” without generating an infinite regress. “Just as I cannot recognize something as mine unless I am already aware of myself, a

influence does propagate faster than light. Maudlin (2002), based on Bell’s theorem, argues that though matters, energy, signals cannot be transmitted faster than light, but causal process can propagate faster than light.

⁵⁶ The “limits of a moment are the limits of a factor exerting its activity.” (Cox 1995: 150)

⁵⁷ A realist, like the Sarvāstivādins, probably would like to take physical sciences into consideration, but what about an idealist, like the Vijñānavādins? Even if all things are consciousness-only or not separate from consciousness, still the distinction is drawn between matter-consciousness and non-matter-consciousness in our living world. To some extent, an idealist would take sciences into account. Besides, external questions pertaining to sciences are raised and can be raised since we live in the contemporary world.

⁵⁸ A similar response in Buddhist studies: “there can be awareness of x without the awareness of the awareness of x. It would be question-begging to assume that there cannot be cognition of the cognition of the pot without cognition of that reflective cognition.” (Siderits 2011: 321)

nonconscious second-order state mental state (that per definition lacks consciousness of itself) cannot recognize or identify a first-order mental state as belonging to the same mind as *itself*.” (Zahavi 2005: 28-29) If a third-order state is needed, then there would still be a problem of infinite regress. Whether this is the last word or not,⁵⁹ the discussion shows that it is an issue that needs to be addressed. Lastly, even if there is no problem of infinite regress, it does not mean that the reflexive theory or the fourfold division theory is false since the problem of infinite regress is mainly used to argue against the reflective theory (the higher-order theory).

From the discussion above one might get the impression that Xuanzang and Kuiji would argue against or at least would not use the metaphor that a lamp illuminates both itself and others. On the contrary, they embrace the metaphor.

A lamp illuminates both itself and others

In CWSL-SJ there is an objection to the lamp metaphor for self-awareness. Since the nature of lamp is illuminating, it does not need to be illuminated. Only those things which are dark, not illuminating, need to be illuminated.⁶⁰ Therefore, it does not make sense to say that a lamp illuminates both itself and others.⁶¹ Kuiji’s response is that there is already an answer in *Fodijing lun* (佛地經論 *Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa*),⁶² which is also translated by Xuanzang.

In *Fodijing lun* the argument in Dignāga’s PS(V) is also used in support of self-awareness. If a cognition were not self-experienced or self-aware, one would not remember that cognition, just as one cannot remember what one has not seen before. Therefore, our consciousness is self-experienced or self-aware. Then the question raised is that it is contradictory to common sense, for example, a knife does not cut itself, a fingertip cannot touch itself. The response resorts to the example of lamp, which illuminates itself as well as others. Again, the objection is: Why a lamp, which is not dark, needs to be illuminated?⁶³ The reply is as follows:

⁵⁹ Some deny that there is a necessary connection between the what-it-like aspect and the for-me aspect. (Liang and Lane 2009: 667) See also Armstrong 1997: 726-727. On the other hand, Zahavi argues that “self-awareness is there ... whenever I am acquainted with an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness, that is, whenever there is something it is like for me [to] have the experience.” (Zahavi 2005: 146) Regarding the issue of ownership or mineness, Zahavi criticizes Metzinger’s analysis of thought insertion and Cotard’s syndrome. (Zahavi 2005: 143-145)

⁶⁰ 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「燈若性照，更何須照？若非明者，應非能照，體應是闇」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 321, a21-23)

⁶¹ Regarding the issue whether or not the *pramāṇas* establish themselves as well as other things, Nāgārjuna argues that it does not make sense to say that fire illuminates itself in verses 30-39 in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. For Nāgārjuna’s pertinent argument in the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, see Yao 2005: 54. For the Vaibhāsikas’ arguments against the simile of lamp, see Yao 2005: 52-54.

⁶² 《成唯識論述記》卷 3：「然佛地第三，有解燈照難。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 321, a24)

⁶³ See 《佛地經論》，CBETA, T26, no. 1530, p. 303, a26-b4.

“This is just like jars, cloth, etc. Although their [self-]nature is not darkness, in the absence of a lamp, etc. to illuminate them, they are encompassed by the obstruction of darkness, so one cannot see them in perception. When lamps, etc. illuminate them, [the light] clears away the encompassing darkness, making [those things] visible to perception. We call that ‘illumination.’ Lamps, etc. are the same case. When their self-nature [to illuminate] arises, the encompassing obstruction of darkness is cleared away,⁶⁴ making them visible to perception; therefore, this is called ‘self-illumination.’”⁶⁵

A cognition of object is aware of itself, just as a lamp illuminates others as well as itself, but unlike different kind of things, e.g. knives, with which one shall not confuse the kind of cognitions and lamps.⁶⁶ Whether or not it makes sense to say that a lamp illuminates itself, and whether or not the analogical argument is convincing, is not my concern in this paper. Instead, the question is why the metaphor is embraced by Xuanzang and Kuiji. Interestingly, at the end of the above-cited passage, it is stated that the explanation is offered in respect of the theory of two parts/aspects, which is a rough analysis.⁶⁷ Hence the metaphor is employed for the case that the part of perceiving is aware of the part of perceived as well as itself. This may be one understanding of Dignāga’s idea of self-awareness,⁶⁸ however, it is not Dharmapāla’s or Xuanzang’s understanding. As mentioned previously, according to CWSL and *Fodijing lun*, there are three parts in Dignāga’s theory, and four parts in Dharmapāla’s. Then could one say that the metaphor is only used for the twofold division theory so that Xuanzang or Kuiji does not in fact embrace the metaphor? I don’t think so.

First, it is not seen in the pertaining text that Xuanzang or Kuiji criticizes the lamp metaphor. More importantly, as illustrated previously, the third part is aware of the second, and the third and the fourth are aware of each other, that is to say, the part of self-awareness, in effect, is aware of the part of perceiving as well as aware of itself (although via its twin, the fourth part). Furthermore, the four parts are differentiated according to their functional differences, but they are not separate in respect of one consciousness or one substance.⁶⁹ As one thing, a consciousness of object is also

⁶⁴ If that is the case, the lamp, strictly speaking, does not act on itself but on the darkness.

⁶⁵ 《佛地經論》卷3：「如瓶、衣等，體雖非闇，無燈等照，邊有闇障，不得現見，燈等照時，除彼邊闇，令得現見，說名為照，燈等亦爾，自體生時，邊闇障除，令得現見，故名自照。」(CBETA, T26, no. 1530, p. 303, b4-7) Translation, slightly altered, *per* Lusthaus 2009: 210.

⁶⁶ 《佛地經論》卷3：「諸心、心法雖有勝劣，皆能外緣、內證自體，猶如光明既能照他亦能自照，非如刀等諸法，法爾不可一類。」(CBETA, T26, no. 1530, p. 303, b7-9)

⁶⁷ 《佛地經論》卷3：「此就麤相，諸心、心法各有相、見二分而說」(CBETA, T26, no. 1530, p. 303, b9-10)

⁶⁸ Some contemporary scholars also interpret Dignāga’s theory as consisting of two aspects. For example, see Coseru 2012: Ch.8.

⁶⁹ 《成唯識論述記》卷3：「據功能別，名為非即；四用一體，名為非離」(CBETA, T43, no.

conscious of itself. I guess that's why Xuanzang and Kuiji would not like to criticize the lamp metaphor. In sum, in one respect, they stick to the anti-reflexivity principle; in another respect, they embrace the metaphor for self-awareness or self-experienced.

About the aboutness and what-it-is-likeness

According to the fourfold division theory, the second part has as its object only the first part, the third has as its object the second and also the fourth, and the fourth has its object only the third. Unlike the “of” used only “to satisfy a grammatical requirement” in Sartre’s “*conscience (de) soi*”, (Zahavi 2005: 23) the “of” seems to be taken literally or seriously when they say that the third part is aware of the second and of the fourth, and the fourth part is aware of third. But is there any further explanation of “being aware of” in respect of self-awareness? It might be explored indirectly via a passage discussing non-discriminative awareness (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) by using self-awareness as an example in CWSL.

“There is an interpretation [by Dharmapāla]: this [non-discriminative] awareness has the part of perceiving, but not the part of perceived. ... Although it does not have the part of perceived, still it can be said that it arises with the characteristic of thusness (*tathatā*), because it is not separate from thusness. Just as the part of self-awareness, when having as its object the part of perceiving, does not transform into an object, [i.e. the part of perceived as representation, the object-appearance], so too this [non-discriminative awareness] does [not transform into an object]. If it transformed into an object, then it would not be intimately aware of [thusness].”⁷⁰

As mentioned previously, there are two criteria of *ālambana* (cognitive object). The first (C1) is that an object-cognition must arise with the appearance or form of the object. According to CWSL-SJ, one objection is that if non-discriminative awareness does not arise with the appearance of thusness, then thusness is not its object.⁷¹ In other words, it does not know thusness. As a response, it is said in CWSL that “it arises with the characteristic of thusness.” The non-discriminative awareness arises with the characteristic of thusness itself, but not with the image as the part of perceived (the image as the object-appearance) of thusness. The former “with” is understood as

1830, p. 320, b2-3)

⁷⁰ 《成唯識論》卷9：「有義：此智見有相無 … 雖無相分，而可說此帶如相起，不離如故，如自證分緣見分時，不變而緣，此亦應爾。變而緣者，便非親證」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 49, c27-p. 50, a3)

⁷¹ 《成唯識論述記》卷9：「第二師云：《所緣論》說：識依彼生，帶彼相故，名緣於彼。若無真如相，應非是所緣！」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 569, b22-23); See also 《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 500, c5-7.

holding something under the arm; the latter “with” is understood as bearing the image as representation.⁷² Because consciousness is “not separate from thusness”, which can be understood as the nature or state of consciousness-only,⁷³ it arises with the characteristic of thusness itself.

Therefore, thusness is the object of non-discriminative awareness if one accepts the reinterpretation of C1. The topic of concern here is that since self-awareness is taken as an example, from the above discussion one could know that according to CWSL, the part of self-awareness is intimately (or directly, proximately) aware of the part of perceived, but without any image or representation of that part.

Another following objection in CWSL-SJ is that since the mind (consciousness) also arises with its concomitants, the concomitants would be the objects of consciousness, which is absurd. The response is that even mind arises with and in dependence upon its concomitants, but the mind is not about or not intending them, hence they are not the objects.⁷⁴ Indeed, the reinterpretation of C1 also specifies that only consciousness can be about or can intend an object and that’s why even though there can be images of things in a mirror but those things cannot be the objects of a mirror.⁷⁵

It seems to me that it roughly expresses the idea that the intentionality or aboutness is a mark of the mental. Furthermore, self-awareness, in addition to the part of perceiving, is also intentional since it intends the part of perceiving, taken as the object with which it arises with, although it is intimately aware of that part without additional image or representation of that part. In addition to the difference in the problem of infinite regress, with respect to the issue of representation, the fourfold division theory, even though not reflexive in detail, might be considered as different from the higher-order theories, which assume that the higher-order representation is needed for the first-order state’s being conscious.

One more thing. Zahavi pointed out that there are two sides of what-it-is-likeness: “what is the object like for the subject” and “what is the experience of the object like for the subject.” (Zahavi 2005: 123) Borrowing his terms and applying to the fourfold division theory, one might say that the side that “what is the object like for the subject” refers to the state of the third part’s being aware (conscious) of the second part

⁷² 《成唯識論述記》卷 9：「述曰：此緣真智，挾帶真如之體相起故名所緣，非帶彼相分影像而起名緣於如，不離如故。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 569, b24-26); See also 《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 500, c7-13; p. 271, c26-28.

⁷³ 《成唯識論》卷 9：「此諸法勝義，亦即是真如，常如其性故，即唯識實性」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 48, a1-2) Cf. *Triṃśikā* v.25.

⁷⁴ 《成唯識論述記》卷 7：「若相言體，即有同時心、心所之體相，亦心挾帶而有。雖有所託，然非所慮故，非所緣緣故。」(CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 500, c13-15); See also 《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 569, c1-3.

⁷⁵ See 《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830, p. 500, c27-p. 501, a4.

although the object is determined as blue, non-blue, etc. by the second part's intending the first part. The side that "what is the experience of the object like for the subject" refers to the state of the fourth part's being aware of the third part although the experience of the object is determined as desirable or undesirable by the third part's intending the second part. Moreover, since the third and the fourth are aware of each other, the third part, in effect, is aware of itself. Therefore, the side that "what is the experience of the object like for the subject" could be said to refer to the state of the third part's being aware of its intending the second part. It might account for the fact that "[a]lthough these two sides can be distinguished conceptually, they cannot be separated." (Zahavi 2005: 123)

Just a Short Note Before the End

It is shown that there is the third way between phenomenology and the higher-order theories of consciousness, between the reflexive model and the reflective model, regarding the problem of infinite regress in particular. The main purpose of this paper is not to prove or to argue for the four division theory of consciousness, but to clearly present the structure and the consistent or systematic way of thinking that leads to the notion of awareness of self-awareness and to point out some issues that need to be addressed so that it might be more convenient for people to argue against or for the theory and to pursue further the pertinent issues. It is hoped that people will not take the theory just as a doctrine or dismiss it before having a chance to look at it carefully. In any case, the thinking of the fourfold division theory, if "deserves the attention", (Kern 1988: 282) is not so much phenomenologically oriented as exegetically or metaphysically oriented, although it might be interesting to graft the theory onto phenomenology, and vice versa.

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