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Shared emotions and extended minds

Dan Zahavi

Center for Subjectivity Research

University of Copenhagen & University of Oxford

Extended minds and collective intentionality

- Two separate discussions
- Is the mind confined within the boundaries of the skull or does it extend into the external world and can it be said to incorporate various external objects?
- Can collective intentions be reduced to an aggregate of suitably interrelated individual intentions or are there irreducible we-intentions, and might it even be necessary to attribute collective intentions to a plural subject?
- Let us try to see what happens if we bring these two discussions together
- Are shared emotions extended emotions?

Emotional sharing

- What is going when two (or more) people share emotions?
- How should we understand cases of collective excitement, collective fear, or collective anger?
- Individual experience + reciprocal knowledge
- Not satisfactory
 - Fails to capture that what you experience when you do it together with others differs from what you experience when you do it alone
 - Fails to capture the crucial togetherness
- Widespread rejection of distributive, summative or aggregative accounts of we-intentionality

Two alternatives

- Let us consider two recent non-reductionist accounts of shared emotions
- A top down and a bottom-up
- Margaret Gilbert
- Joel Krueger

Gilbert on plural subjects

- We cannot account for the social world in singularist terms
- We have to operate with a notion of a collective we
- A collective we is not a mere aggregate of persons
- It involves a sense of unity
- It links individuals such that they jointly constitute a plural subject
- A plural subject does not denote some kind of group mind
- It is the name for any number of persons who are unified in a certain way because of a joint commitment



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Normative constraints

- To be jointly committed is to commit to act as a body, i.e., as a unit or as one
- A joint commitment is a commitment of two or more people, where each party is answerable to all parties for any violation of the joint commitment, and where none are in a position to unilaterally rescind from this commitment
- If we decide to go for a walk together, and I suddenly leave you, you have the right to rebuke me
- The notion of joint commitments can explain the appropriateness of such a rebuke

From action to emotion

- When talking of the joint commitments involved in doing something together, the "doing" must be construed broadly so as to also include psychological states such as believing, intending and feeling something together
- Gilbert argues that her account is able to handle all shared intentions, including cognitive, conative and affective states
- "Persons X, Y, and so on, are collectively excited if and only if they are jointly committed to be excited as a body."
- Persons taking part in a collective emotion are entitled "to rebuke one another for behaviour that is not in the spirit of the collective emotion"
- Having a collective emotion is a matter of the participant's "public performance", rather than of what they might individually experience
- The difference between individual emotions and collective emotions is not a phenomenal difference. As Gilbert writes, "a pang is a pang is a pang". Rather, they differ in terms of the involved judgments or thoughts

Which emotions fit Gilbert's model?

• Members of a group reach the following agreement: A group member who reveals the secrets of the group to any outsider will be met with contempt and anger from the other group members. If the group members commit themselves to upholding this principle, and if on the occasion of a later transgression, one of the group members fails to comply by showing sympathy towards the transgressor, the other group members are entitled to rebuke the member in question.

Is this a paradigmatic case of shared affects?

Shared affects

- Two people who feel joy together seem like a good case for a shared emotion
- I watch a movie together with a friend
- We enjoy the movie together
- The enjoyment I feel as a result of watching the movie together with my friend is quite different from the enjoyment I would have felt, had I seen the movie on my own
- It is not simply a modulation of my experience of joy; rather it is an
 experience which is felt as ours, as co-owned, as one we are
 experiencing together
- Is it a shared emotion because of a joint commitment?
- Am I entitled to rebuke my friend, if he at some point doesn't any longer enjoy the movie?
- In collective emotions we are often bound together by affects that overwhelm us
- In such cases, the notion of joint commitment seems of little relevance

Krueger on jointly owned intentions

- Drawing inspiration from some suggestions made by Merleau-Ponty in the lecture course Les relations avec autrui chez l'enfant
 - How we come to understand others might be less of an enigma if we postulate an initial state of undifferentiation and take the beginning of psychogenesis to be a state where the child is unaware of itself and the other as different beings
- Mutual affect regulation
- Infant and caregiver function as a coupled social system
- The adult's emotion is part of the process responsible for the realization of the infant's emotion



Token identity

- The infant is coupled experientially to the caregiver in a state of phenomenal undifferentiation
- A numerically single experience is shared by two different subjects
- "In cases of collective emotions, a token emotion extends across multiple subjects; here, one emotion is collectively realized by multiple participants. The possibility of collective emotions is philosophically intriguing because it challenges the common intuition that the ontology of emotions is such that they can only be realized by individuals" (Krueger 2016, 269)

Problems

- What does it mean to say that the two individuals are having the same emotions?
- It cannot simply mean that their emotions target the same object
- It has to mean that they literally share the same episode of experiencing
- Emotional co-regulation and constitutive interdependence are crucial features of emotional sharing
- Emotional co-regulation and constitutive interdependence ≠ identity of experiencing
- Rapist and victim
- Infant and adult
- Historicity of experiential life

The Golden Mean

- Summative models seek to account for shared emotions in terms of mere aggregation
- Token identity models seek to account for shared emotions in terms of a phenomenological fusion
- Let me propose an account that avoid
 - A too tight affective integration (fusion, token-identity or phenomenal subject-identity) and a too loose coupling (mere synchronicity, aggregation or summation).
 - As well as a too cognitively demanding (Gilbert) and a too cognitively undemanding (Krueger) account
- Shared emotions are understood in terms of a constitutive integration of the experiences of different individuals, one that preserves interpersonal difference while involving a form of mutual identification

The winning curling team

- In its most basic form, emotional sharing involves emotional interpersonal interaction, where the participating individuals are reciprocally affecting and experiencing each other.
- Emotional sharing (Miteinanderfühlen) must be distinguished from emotional contagion (Gefühlsansteckung)
- Compare the case where one's distress is enhanced by the distress of five other people in a waiting room, who also missed their transatlantic flight, with being part of a winning sports team.
- The joy and pride one feels with one's teammates when realizing that
 victory is at hand is not simply individual joy and pride, nor is it simply a
 joy and pride that is causally dependent upon the bodily proximity of
 certain other actors. It is a joy and pride that is felt together with others,
 as one that we are having: I experience the joy and pride not simply as
 mine but as ours.
- A requirement for this kind of experience to occur is that I am aware of not being the only one who feels this way, but also aware that my teamcolleagues feel the same way – and vice versa.

The role of reciprocity

- Why is reciprocity needed?
- Consider a case, where I am observing from a distance a couple of grieving parents in front of a tomb.
- I realize that they are grieving because of their dead son; I am also saddened by his death.
- The parents, however, remain unaware of both my presence and my emotional state.
- In such a situation, it does not seem appropriate to speak of me as sharing the grief of the parents. The felt grief is not given as *our* grief; it is not one we are feeling *together*.
- It seems counterintuitive to call a felt emotion 'shared' unless the subject of the experience is aware of the presence and participation of others and vice-versa
- Consider, for a similar case, shared (or joint) attention. On a standard reading, the fact that I am aware of your attention (but not reciprocally) is not sufficient for shared attention to occur

Constitutive interdependence is not enough

- Shared emotions require a plurality of individuals who are reciprocally aware of each other
- But interaction and emotional co-regulation are still not sufficient for sharing: Think of two people who are having a heated argument and in turn insult each other
- What more is needed?
- A "Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit" (Gerda Walther in Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften)
- A feeling or sense of togetherness = some kind of identification or integration with the other(s)
- This is clearly missing in the rapist case

Identification

- Identification makes a difference
- A shared emotion isn't simply felt as mine, but as ours
- But in order for that to happen, one needs to identify with the other(s) in order to experience oneself as one of us.
- Different accounts of how this might happen
- Too cognitively demanding?
- Different types of identification
 - Fleeting to more enduring
 - Implicit to more explicit
- Peter Hobson
 - Identifying-with can already be found in young infants' affective engagement with others

Shared emotions and extended emotions

- Classical criticism: The "extended-emotion thesis potentially confuses the claim that the environment makes a causal contribution to a mental process with the more ontologically demanding claim that it is a constituent part of it" (Griffiths and Scarantino 2009, 448).
- Emotional contagion vs emotional sharing
- The constitutive integration cum identification required in the case of shared emotions goes beyond not only summation or aggregation but also beyond cases of mere coupling or co-regulation
- Shared emotions are prima facie examples of socially extended emotions

Much more to say about emotions

- Emotional contagion shared emotions collective emotions
- I am sitting watching a soccer match between Denmark and Sweden on television with my son. The two of us are enjoying the match together
- The enjoyment I feel as a result of watching the match together with my son is quite different from the enjoyment I would have felt, had I seen the match on my own
- I am sitting alone watching the match on television. The match ends with a Danish victory, and I joyfully exclaim "We won!"
- I can experience myself as a member of a group, can identify with other members of the same group, and can thereby come to have experiences I wouldn't otherwise have had, even if I am not de facto together with others
- I am sitting at the soccer stadium cheering with the other Danish fans.
 Suddenly a bomb goes off, and panic ensues. Everybody rushes towards the exits
- I am feeling panic in a way I wouldn't feel had I been on my own, but is it a shared panic or is it simply my own panic being modulated and enhanced in specific ways due to the causal proximity of others?

Wider implications

- How should one think of the relation between social ontology and philosophy of mind?
- Might findings in the former domain put pressure on certain basic assumptions in the philosophy of mind and vice versa?
- What does the existence of shared emotions and other weexperiences tell us about the nature of consciousness and selfhood?
- Do they testify to the fluid character of selfhood?
- Is the fact that we can identify with a group and adopt a weperspective compatible with just any notion of self, or does it rule out certain overly static and disembodied models?

Jewish Voices

- Semyon Frank (1877-1950)
 - "The I is only possible in its relation to a you, that is, as a member of a we"
- Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Kotzk (1787-1859)
 - "If I am I, because you are you, and you are you, because I am I, then I am not I, and you are not you. But if I am I because I am I, and you are you because you are you, then I am I and you are you, and we can talk."
- Does the I require a communal grounding, or does the we presuppose a pre-existing plurality of selves?

The Chinese context


- Is collective identity primary? Does my groupmembership exhaustively define who I am?
- Are the existence of we-phenomena compatible with a no-self doctrine or do they require some commitment to realism about selfhood?
- Some Buddhist thinkers have advocated the view that there is no deep difference – not even an experiential one – between me and you
- If the difference between self and other is illusory, and if selves in any case are illusory, can we then at all accommodate something like shared experiences or do we have to reject them as illusory as well?

Conclusion: I, You and We

- Martin Buber: "The nameless, faceless crowd in which I am entangled is not a We [,,,] Only men who are capable of truly saying *Thou* to one another can truly say We with one another"
- A we-community is founded upon persons in communicative relationships
- A we-community involves a bridging rather than an eradication of interpersonal differences
- It consequently presupposes the latter
- It is very difficult to opt for a restricted eliminativism about selfhood
- If there is no I, there is also no you, no we, no community and no social reality

Thanks for your attention!

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The Sense Organs, Awareness and Luminosity:
A Constructed and Revived Conversation between
Classical Chinese and Indian Thought

Douglas L. Berger
Leiden University
Selfhood, Otherness and Cultivation
National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Parameters of the Debate

- Two Dimensions of Consciousness in Classical Indian and Chinese Perspectives
 - ❖ What sorts of debates could have been prompted by an ancient discussion about the relation of the bodily sense organs to awareness? (A reconstructed conversation about the unconsciousness or consciousness of the body)
 - * The "luminosity of mind" spoken of sporadically in Indian Yogācāra texts that is metaphysically amplified in Chinese Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. (Changes Chinese philosophical orientations toward subjectivity)
- What can be drawn from these discussions for modern scholarship and philosophical reflection?
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Classical Brāhmiṇical Thought I

- * Sāṃkhya/ Nyāya, six sense organs, five external and one internal, known alternatively as the tripartite *antaḥkāraṇa* and *manas*
- ❖ Sāṃkhya / Nyāya, each external sense organ constituted by a basic physical element (nose-earth, tongue-water, eye-fire, skin-wind, ear-akasa), corresponding to elements in the environment.
- ❖ Inner sense: for Sāṃkkya, *antaḥkāraṣa* is made from subtle matter, awareness, ego-sense and cognitive synthesis.
- * For, Nyāya, manas is atomic, detects outer/inner contacts.

Classical Brāhmiņical Thought II

- --In Sāṃkhya, sense organs made of three dynamic strands (*guṇa*-s) of energy, translucence, movement and inertia, and so dynamically and actively interact with guna-constituted environment out of *raga* or passion with beauty.
- --In Nyāya, sense organs constituted because of karmic residue, which explains why organs act intentionally toward objects and do not just react to their environment like stones.

Classical Brāhmiṇical Thought III

- Arguments for unconsciousness of sense organs
 - ❖ Body made of constantly changing dynamic energy as well as compounded, so can't be source of continuous or unified awareness
 - original state of matter contained no causal source of consciousness
 - Dead bodies possess no consciousness
 - ❖ sense organs are said in Sanskrit to be instruments, thus are in the instrumental case, and so can't be the agent, the subject term in a sentence, that can be said to know, ect.

Classical Brāhmiṇical Thought IV

- * The unconsciousness of matter entails for Hindu schools that consciousness must have its source in a spiritual and not material substance; for Sāṃkhya it is the cognitive luminosity of *puruṣa* and for Nyāya it is the highly individuated, personality-possessing self (ātman).
- ❖ For Sāṃkhya, the sense organs contain the only powers of action and moral causation, since the self merely illuminates the world and does not "do" anything.
- ❖ For Nyāya, the self is the agent of both awareness and action, but could not experience anything or act without being embodied; upon release, the self is unconscious.

Classical Chinese Thought I

- * Fairly wide agreement that there are five external organs and one internal organ, the \(\mathcal{L}\) xin or heart, though, as we'll see, other elements are involved as well.
- ❖ The external organs are often said to hold their own "offices" (官 guan), and do not do the jobs of other officials. So, there is a specified role for each organ in its engagements with things and sensibilia of corresponding sorts.

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Classical Chinese Thought II

- * Again, in wide agreement, the sense organs each have their own 知 zhi, as well as their own desires (汝 yu) and loves (好 hao), and so they actively seek pleasurable stimuli and avoid unpleasant ones.
- ❖ But in their direct possession of sensory and dispositional capacities, the external sense organs were themselves believed to be conscious, in stark contrast to Brāhminical models.

Classical Chinese Thought III

- ❖ The *xin* is often seen as ruler of other bodiliy organs, because of its special functions to select (择 *ze*), to levy (徴知 *zheng zhi*), to tally (符 *fu*), to approve or disapprove (*shi-fei*) of various things, and sometimes (in the Mengzi) it is thought to contain incipient moral feelings.
- ❖ The heart then often acts like a controller, but its consciousness is its own and owes its awareness, like other sense organs, to its physicality.

Classical Chinese Thought IV

- --In various places in the *Mengzi*, *Xunzi* and *Zhuangzi*, the body's 氣 *qi* is also said to be aware of and interact with environing circumstances, music or personal cultivation, and one can at times even "see" and understand with it more virtuously than with the sense organs.
- --In the ZZ, it is spirit (神 *shen*) that is the most supreme of all capacities of knowledge, enables one to act most skillfully and be the most genuine (*zhen*).

Summary Observations I

❖ Though there are fascinating structural similarities between the ways early Indian and Chinese thinkers conceived of the sense organs and their capacities, the fundamental disagreement between them seems to be about whether or not to attribute consciousness to the body itself, with the former denying the proposition and the latter affirming it.

Summary Observations II

- * Disagreement leads to questions about to what degree sense organs themselves can be said to possess awareness.
- ❖ While Brāhmiṇical arguments against consciousness of sense organs seem to be unconvincing, Chinese philosophers most often assume sense organs and body are aware without providing arguments in support of the view. 37


Summary Observations III

- ❖ Buddhist thought in India, generally willing to acknowledge that bodily organs could become aware under the right causal circumstances, received welcome in China.
- ❖ But identification of xin with luminous awareness that was the causal basis of enlightenment tended to motivate Chinese Buddhists and neo-Confucians to centralize bodily awareness in xin, though they continued to acknowledge physicality of senation.

The Vijnānavāda View of Luminosity

If it (the storehouse consciousness) were not continuously afflicted, then all embodied beings would be ever-released. If it were not purified, then even inhaling would be without any fruit. It is not afflicted, nor is it non-afflicted. It is not pure, nor indeed is it pure. How can it be neither afflicted, nor again impure? This is owing to its primordial nature (prakṛtyā). Its nature is the luminosity of the mind (prabhāsvaram cittam). Its possession of affliction is contingent.

Vasabandhu, Madhyānta Vibhāga, 22-23



Revisions in Wei Shi (唯識) I

The fundamental consciousness (ālayavijnāna) is the basis 根本 for all the defilements, but does not act 作 as a basis 根本 for the noble path (聖道, ārya mārga). Alamanavjnāna 阿摩羅識, on the other hand, is not the basis for the defilements, but only 但 acts as a basis for the noble path and the attainment of the path. The amalavijnāna acts as a cause for the predurance (pratiṣṭhā-hetu) but does not act as a cause for the generation (janma-hetu) of it (the fundamental consciousness).

Paramārtha (真諦), *Jueding zang*, 1025c33-35a17 (Radich, 2008, 54)

Revisions in Wei Shi (唯識) II

Question: If this is the case, then given that there is no impurity by essential nature 自性浄, how can it be ascertained 分判 that the *dharma* realm (法接 *dharmadhātu*) is neither pure nor impure?

Answer: *Amalavijnāna* is the aboriginally pure (Skt. "luminous") mind (自性清浄心, *prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta*). It is only because it is tainted 污 by adventitious dirt 客塵 that we speak of it as "impure;" because of adventitious dirt, [that is,] we establish that it is also impure.

Shiba kong lun 863b06-21 Radich (2008, 74-75

Platform Sūtra The Poem of Shenxiu

身是菩提樹 The body/person (身) is the tree

of true awakening (菩提).

心如明鏡臺 The heart/mind (心) is like (如)

a bright (明) mirror stand (鏡臺).

時時勤佛拭 Always, always, as a diligent Buddha,

clean (it).

莫使有塵埃 Do not allow there to be dust (塵埃).

Platform Sūtra The First Poem of Huineng

菩提本無樹 True awakening (菩提), at its root (本),

is not a tree.

明鏡亦無臺 The bright mirror (明鏡), too,

is no stand.

佛性常清淨 Buddha nature (佛性) is constantly /

always (常) clear and pure (清淨).

何處有塵埃 Where is there any dust?

Yuan Ren Lun Zongmi on Primordial Qi and Mind


all the way back to its origin, is the primal pnuema (元氣 yuan qi) of the undifferentiated oneness, and the mind that arises, when it is thoroughly investigated all the way back to its source, is the numinous mind of the absolute (即真一之靈心 ji zhen yi zhi ling xin, perhaps better rendered as "enlightened mind of completely genuine unity"). In ultimate terms, there is nothing outside of mind...Objects likewise develop from the fine to the crude, continuing to evolve from the transformation (of the *ālayavijnāna*) into heaven and earth (天地 tian di). When *karma* has ripened, then one receives one's endowment of the two vital forces (二氣 *er qi*, the common designation for *yang* and *yin*) from one's father and mother, and when it has interfused with activated consciousness (業識 ye shi, which technically refers to the active sense cognitions but literally means "karmic consciousness"), the human body (人身 ren shen) is completely formed.

Linji Yu Lu The Luminous Mind in Linji's Discourse

若約山僧見處.無不甚深無不解脫.道流.心法無形通貫十方.在眼曰見.在耳曰聞.在鼻嗅香.在口談論.在手執捉。在足運奔.本是一精明.分為六和合.一心既無.隨處解脫.

As I see it, there are none who are not of the utmost profundity, none who aren't emancipated. Followers of the Way, mind is without form and pervades the ten directions. In the eye it is called seeing, in the ear it is called hearing. In the nose, it smells odors, in the mouth it holds converse. In the hands it grasps and seizes, in the feet it runs and carries. Fundamentally it is one pure radiance; divided it becomes the six harmoniously divided spheres of sense. If the mind is void, wherever you are, you are emancipated.

Linji Yu Lu 0497b24-c07 (Sasaki & Kirchner 2009, 162, 165)



Four Scholarly Observations

- --Realism and luminosity of mind were not mutually exclusive positions in India.

 Cognitive light was required because physical body was believed to be unconscious.

 No choice between realist and phenomenological considerations, but a mixture of them.
- --Indian Buddhist adoption of the luminosity of mind vocabulary was an opportunity for them to describe the possibility of perfection through consummated practice and the nature (*dharmatā*) of consciousness to reveal the outer and inner world to us.
- --Luminosity of mind discourse in China provoked some major reconsiderations of human subjectivity, centering awareness in the heart-mind for first soteriological reasons and then theoretical insights.
- --No Cartesian or Kantian revolution took place in Chinese thought, since luminosity discourse had practical focus; we discover what consciousness is by investigating what it is capable of.

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Two Philosophical Considerations

- ❖ Might it be possible to see some basic level of luminous awareness as being necessary for species life? Without the fundamental abilities to be aware of external and internal environments and the even more basic capacity to read and copy information, life could not persist.
- ❖ Taking a cue from the incorrigible optimism about human capabilities those who believed in the luminous mind held, might we not be able to find some hope for humanity in the recesses of consciousness? After one hundred and fifty years of mistrusting our highest values since Nietzsche and our deepest depths since Freud, might the luminous mind provoke us, as Master Linji commissioned, to believe in ourselves?

Ellie Wang huawang@nccu.edu.tw

Ritual practices and shame both play important roles in Confucianism and in the Chinese culture in general. Early Confucians, starting from Confucius, already stress the relation between the two. However, there has been a criticism that the emphasis on the role of ritual renders Confucian shame an "external", "outward-looking" attitude, and thus not satisfying the moral ideal of autonomy and inferior to "inward-looking" attitudes such as guilt. In this paper, I address this criticism by first attending to replies made by Roetz and Shun. I then point out my dissatisfaction with Roetz's "autonomy interpretation" and Seok and Geaney's "tactile interpretation" of Shun's view on Confucian shame, and develop my own interpretation, the Agent-Contact view, with attention to Confucian texts, including the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, the *Xunzi*, and the *Book of Rites*. I argue that Confucian shame is a cultivated virtue through learning and ritual practices. It results from a feeling of lack with regard to agency through contact with otherness, which includes other people and the world as a whole. The fact that the early Confucians think that we are (and should be) able to feel shame in this way tells us their notion of the self, and how it can (and should) relate to the world through cultivation. Understood in this way, one opposition to Confucian shame is not pride, but a form of reverence (jin ‡/5).

I. Confucius on Ritual and Shame, and Fingarette's Comment on Externality

One common understanding of shame is a negative affective attitude toward oneself in its totality. It involves a global devaluation of the self, due to an experience of disgrace or humiliation. This attitude plays an important role in Confucians' view of ethics and politics. In early Confucian texts, it is expressed mainly in chi $\overline{\mathbb{N}}$ and xiu $\underline{\mathbb{E}}$, but also in words such as can $\overline{\mathbb{E}}$, kui $\overline{\mathbb{E}}$, zuo $\overline{\mathbb{E}}$, and their combinations. Chi $\overline{\mathbb{N}}$ is an ideogrammic compound formed by two parts: the ear $\overline{\mathbb{E}}$ and the heartmind $\overline{\mathbb{N}}$. The idea expressed by this compound is either the feeling one experiences after hearing about one's own mistake, or when one feels shame in one's heartmind it is expressed in one's ear turning hot.² This word may refer to the feeling of shame itself, or the thing that one is ashamed of. Today xiu $\underline{\mathbb{E}}$ mainly refers to the feeling of shame or shyness.³ It originally is also an ideogrammic compound formed by two parts, a goat's head $\underline{\mathbb{E}}$ and a hand $\underline{\mathbb{E}}$. The idea expressed by this compound is to make a sacrificial offering or treat important guests.⁴ It obtains two extended

¹It should be noted that early Confucians might not have exactly the same ideas about Confucian shame; at least, they have different emphasis when it comes to this topic. Mencius is more concerned with our ethical subjectivity, and therefore emphasizes more on the innate abilities we have that can be cultivated into virtues, such as a natural sense of shame or an impulsive reaction of compassion. Xunzi, on the other hand, is more concerned with the distinction between heaven and men, and the accumulative effort that is required to be good. His emphasis is thus more on the accumulative effort one needs to make in order to become virtuous, in this case, to have a virtuous sense of shame. In this paper, I do not focus on the differences among these thinkers. Rather, I try to capture the aspect of Confucian shame they all agree on.

² Liù shū zǒng yào《六書總要》:從心耳會意。 取聞過自愧之義。 凡人心慙(慚),則耳熱面赤,是其驗也。

 $^{^3}$ Note that chi 恥 is mainly used for the feeling of disgrace shame, while xiu may be used more broadly, also referring to being bashful or coy. For example, xiu is used as chi in 「吾羞,不忍為之下。」《史記·廉頗藺相如列傳》; while xiu is used as being bashful in 「十四為君婦,羞顏未嘗開。」《長干行》.

⁴ Shuowen Jiezi, a dictionary from the Han Dynasty. It is the earliest Chinese dictionary as we know of. (《說文解字》: 羞:進獻也。从羊,羊,所進也;从丑,丑亦聲。)

meanings: when focusing on the person making the offering, it means the attitude of humility and shame; when focusing on the things being offered, it means "to recommend 薦" and "something precious and delicious 饈."⁵

It is interesting to note that the origin of the word xiu (to make an offering humbly) echoes what many evolutionary psychologists today believe to be the evolutionary origin of shame. Shame in its primitive, behavioral form (e.g., a particular gaze or movement) has been observed in nonhuman animals, and in such cases shame is understood as an appearement strategy to reduce violence or threat in an animal's encounter with a more dominant animal. It signals the recognition of and subordination to authority. 6 Moreover, it is believed that, as human evolve, positive social attention becomes pivotal for individuals to thrive in society. Consequently, the abilities to gain such attention and maintain social image are crucial for adaption, and having a sense of shame is believed to be one of such abilities. One reasonable explanation for this is that people who feel shame can detect one's negative social attention, and are more motivated to correct oneself to maintain one's social image. 8 It is also conceivable that people who recognize proper authority and show humility are considered more trust worthy and part of the community. It should be noted that we often notice the negative responses we have when we experience shame: running away, hiding, and covering up one's face. However, as we can see, both the origin of the word xiu and the evolutionary origin of shame recognize the connection between shame and the humble yet active and responsive attitude (by making offerings, appearement, and/or motivation to correct oneself to maintain one's social image) in recognition of an authority. This is also a crucial aspect of Confucian shame. In this paper I will elaborate on this active responsive aspect of Confucian shame, and on the nature of this authority according to the Confucians.

The ancient Chinese noticed shame as a natural emotion. However, they also renewed the meaning of the concept shame and the function of this emotion by transforming it into a way of behavioral regulation and a virtue. This move that fundamentally shaped Chinese culture can be traced back to early Confucians in the pre-Qin period, arguably starting with Confucius. In the *Analects*, Confucius recognizes that people naturally feel ashamed in certain situations, e.g., wearing a shabby robe while standing next to those who wear glamourous fur coats. However, he makes it clear that one should focus on the Way (the ultimate guiding principle) and have a virtuous sense of shame instead. One should not be ashamed of conventional shames (such as one's ability not being acknowledged by others and thus one can only afford shabby clothes and coarse food)⁹, but should be ashamed when one is petty and not virtuous. For example, one should feel ashamed if one thinks only of one's own salary when serving as a government official and does not take on political

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⁵ Also refer to the entry for xiu in the Chinese Text Project, https://ctext.org/dictionary.pl?if=gb&char=羞

⁶ See, for example, Fessler, 1999; Gilbert, 1989, 1992.

⁷ Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Gilbert, 2001.

⁸ This explanation is mentioned in Soek, 2017.

⁹ The Master said, "A person whose mind is set on truth, and who is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, is not fit to be discoursed with." 子曰:「士志於道,而恥惡衣惡食者,未足與議也。」(Analects, 4.9) The Master said, "Dressed himself in a tattered robe quilted with hemp, yet standing by the side of men dressed in furs, and not ashamed - ah! it is You who is equal to this! He dislikes none, he covets nothing - what can he do but what is good!"子曰:「衣敝縕袍,與衣狐貉者立,而不恥者,其由也與!『不忮不求,何用不臧?』」(Analects, 9.27) Zi Gong asked, saying, "What qualities must a man possess to entitle him to be called a gentleman? The Master said, "He who in his conduct of himself maintains a sense of shame, and when sent to any quarter will not disgrace his prince's commission, deserves to be called an officer."子貢問曰:「何如斯可謂之士矣?」子曰:「行己有恥,使於四方,不辱君命,可謂士矣。」(Analects, 13.20)

responsibilities, and if one's words exceed one's actions.¹⁰ One should also find acts lacking integrity contemptible, such as fine words, insinuating appearances, excessive respect, and concealing resentment against a person while appearing friendly with them.¹¹

Confucius not only encourages people who strive to follow the Way and be good (土/君子) to have this virtuous sense of shame, he also talks about developing this sense of shame in the mass through ritual (li 禮). According to Confucius, people's behavior and character can be regulated by cultivating this proper sense of shame through the guidance of virtue and ritual practices. He finds this form of education more ideal, since in this case people's character is actually transformed to be good — they do not just abide by the social norms due to fear of punishment. A related point is worth noting here: Ritual practices conceivably provide experience and embodied cognition, and cultivate the virtuous sense of shame. The resulting feeling of shame need not come from conscious, reflective deliberation.

Ritual, however, is not just a tool of education for the mass in the *Analects*. It provides important guidance for the cultivation of character for anyone who sets their mind on the Way and tries to be virtuous. When Yan Yuan asked about perfect virtue ren (—, Confucius said, "To subdue one's self and return to ritual propriety, is perfect virtue ren." Another thinker recorded in the *Analects*, You, said, "When respect is shown according to ritual, one keeps far from shame and disgrace." For the Confucians, the Way is embodied in the ritual order, and the practice of ritual is closely related to the Confucians' idea of developing the virtuous sense of shame – the Confucian shame – which protects oneself from what is truly shameful and disgraceful according to the Way.

However, some criticize that this emphasis on the role of ritual and shame in morality is problematic since it does not meet the moral ideal of autonomy. Fingarette (1972), recognizing the connection between ritual and Confucian shame, puts forward a related comment:

Although chih $[\mathfrak{P}]$, shame] is definitely a moral concept and designates a moral condition or response, the moral relation to which it corresponds is that of the person to his status and

¹⁰ The Master said, "When right principles of government prevail in the kingdom, he will show himself; when they are prostrated, he will keep concealed. When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to be ashamed of." 子曰:「天下有道則見,無道則隱。邦有道,貧且賤焉,恥也;邦無道,富且貴焉,恥也。」(Analects, 8.13) Xian asked what was shameful. The Master said, "When good government prevails in a state, to be thinking only of salary (and not trying to make more contribution); and, when bad government prevails, to be thinking only of salary (and not trying to stay out of it and keep one's own integrity) - this is shameful." 憲問恥。子曰:「邦有道,穀;邦無道,穀,恥也。」(Analects, 14.1) The Master said, "The reason why the ancients did not readily give utterance to their words, was that they feared lest their actions should not come up to them." 子曰:「古者言之不出,恥躬之不逮也。」(Analects, 4.22) The Master said, "The superior man finds it shameful if his words exceed his actions."子曰:「君子恥其言而過其行。」(Analects, 14.27) 11 The Master said, "Fine words, an insinuating appearance, and excessive respect - Zuo Qiu Ming was ashamed of them. To conceal resentment against a person, and appear friendly with him - Zuo Qiu Ming was ashamed of such conduct. I also am ashamed of it." 子曰:「巧言、令色、足恭,左丘明恥之,丘亦恥之。匿怨而友其人,左丘明恥之,丘亦恥之。」(Analects, 5.25)

¹² The Master said, "If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by ritual, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good." (子曰:「道之以政,齊之以刑,民免而無恥;道之以德,齊之以禮,有恥且格。」) (Analects, 2.3)

¹³ Analects, 12.1, 顏淵問仁。子曰: 「克己復禮為仁。」

¹⁴ Analects, 1.13 有子曰:「恭近於禮,遠恥辱也。」

role as defined by li [禮, ritual]. Chih thus looks 'outward', not 'inward.' ... It is not, as is guilt, a matter of the inward state, of repugnance at inner corruption, of self-denigration, of the sense that one is as a person, and independently of one's public status and repute, mean or reprehensible. ... The Confucian concept of shame is a genuinely moral concept, but it is oriented to morality as centering in li, traditionally ceremonially defined social comportment, rather than to an inner core of one's being, "the self". ... Shame is a matter of "face", of embarrassment, of social status. 15

Fingarette thinks that Confucian shame derives from one's social status that is designated by ritual, and because of this, it is not about oneself as a person (which is independent of one's social status), but is about a self that is related to others, and understood in the tradition. The emphasis that one's moral self – one's "inner core" – is independent from one's connection with others, while Confucian shame looks "outward" at traditions and social relations, is to suggest that Confucian shame derives from something external to the self. In this paragraph Fingarette did not say that Confucian shame being outward-looking is therefore problematic or inferior in any way, even though he did compare it to guilt and suggest that guilt is more about "one's inner core". However, at the time he wrote this, there has been already a trend in the literature comparing so-called "guilt-cultures" and "shamecultures", and many argued that shame as a moral emotion is inferior to guilt due to its "externality". They argue that shame is a social emotion, occurring when one is observed by others and resulting from the fear of "external sanction" based on the tradition or convention (e.g., losing face 丟臉) or, more specifically, from the people in one's daily contact. Furthermore, shame is concerned with aspects of the self that are external to the core-self, including one's image or social status. Meanwhile, guilt is a kind of "inner feeling" that can be motivated when one is alone, it is just dependent on the normative standard one accepts, and it is about one's core self. 16 According to this view, this "internality" is necessary for the moral ideal of autonomy, which is basically the idea that one's decisions and actions are based on self-rule, and are independent from external influence such as social convention or the authority of the other; and shame, thus understood, falls short in this respect. Fingarette's comparison between shame and guilt as outward and inward concepts may suggest resonance with this trend. Indeed, this is how Roetz (1993)¹⁷ understood Fingarette's point.

II. Roetz's "Autonomy Interpretation" and the "Tactile Interpretation" of Shun

In his reply to Fingarette's comment on Confucian shame, Roetz first makes the distinction between external shame (e.g., shaming from others) and internal shame, and points out that the latter is the prevailing one in early Confucianism. He suggests that, for these Confucians, shame is an "inner-orientated" process, and can be further differentiated into two forms: one "aroused by the internalized judgment of the empirical community", and one "felt before oneself or an idealized audience". He then calls this latter kind an "autonomous form related to self-chosen ideals instead of alien expectations". He argues that this autonomous form of shame is the one early Confucians emphasize most, and this is because they recognize that "the judgment of the community or of the authorities is not reliable, the Confucian 'gentleman' chooses the way of 'self-correction'". This

¹⁵ Fingarette 1972, Confucius – the Secular as Sacred, p.30

¹⁶ BENEDICT, RUTH. 1954. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. Rutland and Tokyo: Tuttle. RIESMAN, DAVID. 1969 [1950]. The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

¹⁷ Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age a Reconstruction Under the Aspect of the Breakthrough Toward Postconventional Thinking by Heiner Roetz

shame comes from something that is "not realized in the empirical world", but "a moral view of man, or an ideal of character, which he finds recommended in the teaching of his school and tries to give shape to in himself." Thus understood, he further argues, shame is a reaction when one fails to live up to one's own moral ideal, which is a "violation of self-respect". And self-respect, according to Roetz, is "the basis of all moral action." I call this Roetz's "autonomy interpretation" of Confucian shame.

Roetz's reply to Fingarette is helpful for us to see that there is an "internal aspect" to Confucian shame. It is true that, for early Confucians, one need not have an actual audience or observer every time to feel shame. ¹⁹ Even though the origin of the word chi \$\Pi\$, as we have seen, may suggest that shame involves hearing about one's own fault, which in turn suggests some form of presence of others, early Confucians have transformed this idea into a concept of virtue: A proper sense of shame is a character trait, a disposition that responds to relevant situations appropriately, according to the normative standard of Confucianism one internalized through cultivation. In general, it is reasonable to think that one may internalize others' views and develop a sense of shame. Shame in this case is not a form of "external sanction" anymore. Moreover, when this internalized view is a moral ideal one chooses to commit to and is adopted through conscious self-cultivation, instead of conventional views one happens to pick up from their upbringing or in their surroundings, we may even think that there is a form of self-mastery involved in this process.

However, Roetz's "autonomy interpretation" faces some challenges. First, it is doubtful for Roetz to treat autonomy and self-respect as the core concern for the early Confucians or the foundation for morality in their view.²⁰ The ultimate goal of Confucian cultivation is not to achieve autonomy (even though there is self-mastery involved as I just suggested), but to cultivate virtue and become a person of ren (_, a person who cares about others and have a good relation with the world as a whole.²¹ A related worry is Roetz's undue emphasis on the internality of Confucian shame. Even though there is an "internal" aspect to Confucian shame, it should also be noted that the source of the moral ideal for the early Confucians is still "external" in important ways. As I mentioned earlier, to cultivate the virtue of ren, one needs to learn and practice ritual, and be guided by virtuous people. Ritual, according to the Confucians, is an invention of the sages and can be found in the tradition; it embodies good order and is mainly concerned with proper relations and social distinctions. As for guidance from others, sometimes it even helps to encounter people who are morally flawed, since it helps one reflect on one's own possible shortcomings.²² We can see that in this view, to develop the proper sense of shame and become virtuous, one does not already have all the resources by oneself, and needs to rely on others and the tradition, which are both in important sense "external". Moreover, the practice of ritual helps one form a core practical identity that is relational to others

¹⁸ Roetz 1993: 177-9

¹⁹ This echoes what recent philosophical studies of shame have pointed out. For example, Williams argues that shame involves internalization of others' judgment. Gabriele Taylor also points out that one may feel shame even when one is convinced of being alone.

²⁰ As mentioned earlier, Confucians do care strongly about integrity: one's deeds should match one's word. This idea is not only seen in the *Analects*, in the *Xunzi* we can also see a strong emphasis on cheng 誠. However, the concern for integrity is not the same as autonomy.

²¹ I have a paper that address this topic in detail: "Crafting the Self through Losing the Self: Exploring Xunzi's Ideal Self and the Role of Others".

 $^{^{22}}$ Analects 4.17 見賢思齊焉,見不賢而內自省也」。7.22「三人行必有我師焉。擇其善者而從之, 其不善者而改 之。」

and to one's moral community. The underlying conception of the self (and the ideal self) is very different from the one presumed in the moral view whose core emphasis is autonomy.²³

Besides the fact that the cultivation of Confucian shame requires external resources and involves an underlying conception of the (ideal) self that is relational to others, I also want to argue that Confucian shame itself also involves a disposition that is open to otherness. Roetz's "autonomy interpretation" thus puts too much emphasis on the side of internality and fails to capture Confucian shame. Before I elaborate on this point about otherness, I first examine an interpretation of Confucian shame that is located at the other extreme, externality: the tactile interpretation of Shun's view. This discussion helps to clarify my own view on the relation between Confucian shame and otherness.

Shun understands Confucian shame as a concern with things that are beneath oneself or lower one's standing, and as an attitude toward things that reflect adversely on oneself.²⁴ He notes two important aspects of Confucian shame (chi મો) that make it different from shame commonly understood today: 1. Even though the attitude chi can be directed to the way one is treated in public, it is not associated with being seen or heard, but with the thought that one could be "tainted by a certain situation". ²⁵ 2. Relatedly, the reaction typically associated with chi is not hiding or disappearing like shame, but the resolve to distance oneself from the situation that would taint oneself, or, when directed toward one's own past deed, a resolve to remedy the situation. He comments, "Because of the more future-directed emphasis of chi, it is by comparison to shame less controversial that it has a largely constructive function. For these reasons, chi is perhaps more like the attitude of regarding something as contemptible or as below oneself than like the emotion of shame."²⁶

Here Shun agrees with Roetz's reply to Fingarette that there is an internal aspect to Confucian shame: an actual audience or observer is not necessary, but one is concerned with the situation that may taint (or has tainted) oneself due to the norm one has internalized. Shun also notices the active response one has when experiencing Confucian shame: one reacts by aiming to distance oneself from such tainting situation or to do something to change the situation. I basically agree with this depiction of Confucian shame. However, how one may be "tainted by a certain situation" is open to interpretation and Shun did not say more to clarify this expression. One may understand this to mean that there is a situation out there and, by being "touched" by it, one becomes tainted. Seok (2016) and Geaney (2004) both adopt this interpretation of Shun. Soek makes this point clear: "On the basis of [Shun's] tactile model of Confucian shame, observers are not necessary or important, ... because it is the experience of being touched – not being heard or seen – by something that potentially compromises one's self-worth or self-integrity." (Seok 2016: 99) He uses the analogy of "one's drinking or swimming in dirty water (with or without others seeing it)" to illustrate this "tactile model".²⁷

²³ For detailed arguments for this point, please refer to my other paper "Crafting the Self through Losing the Self: Exploring Xunzi's Ideal Self and the Role of Others".

²⁴Shun K-L 1997, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought 59

²⁵ A related point: it is interesting to note that in Confucian text we do not examples of shame to involve nakedness or sexuality.

²⁶ Shun 2001, "Self and self cultivation in early Confucian Thought", In *Two Roads to wisdom? Chinese and analytic philosophical traditions*, 235-6

²⁷ Bongrae Seok, *Moral Psychology of Confucian Shame* 2016: 86. Geaney (2004) also adopts the tactile interpretation of Shun, and develops her "boundary interpretation" from this view. There she argues that Confucian shame is an

This tactile interpretation of Shun, however, is not clearly supported by the Confucian texts. If we read the Analects carefully, we can see that what Confucius says about shame is not really that a situation itself is shameful or contemptible, but how one acts in a situation makes it shameful or contemptible. That is, one is not "touched by" a situation (like swimming in dirty water) and becomes tainted, but if one is tainted, it is by what one does in a situation. Even though sometimes Confucius tells us to avoid being involved in certain situations, it is not clearly meant to avoid shame; rather, he is clear that one can be in shame or not in the same situation, simply depending on how one reacts to a situation. The following comment makes this point clear:

The Master said, "With sincere faith he unites the love of learning; holding firm to death, he is perfecting the excellence of his course. Such a one will not enter a tottering state, nor dwell in a disorganized one. When right principles of government prevail in the kingdom, he will show himself; when they are prostrated, he will keep concealed. When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to be ashamed of." (Analects 8.13 子曰:「篤信好學,守死善道。危邦不入,亂邦不居。天下有道則見,無道則隱。邦有道,貧且賤焉,恥也;邦無道,富且貴焉,恥也。」)

In this comment, Confucius advices to stay away from states in disorder. However, this is not to avoid shame. According to him, it is only when one does not take on political responsibility and get recognition in a well-governed state, or tries to take power in an ill-governed state, one should feel shame. This is because what one should do depends on the situation, and shame as a virtue will reveal the lack of propriety in how one behaves in a given situation.

Xunzi's comment on this virtuous sense of shame makes Confucians' emphasis on agency even more clear:

"What the well-bred man and gentleman can and cannot do: The gentleman can make himself honorable, but he cannot ensure that others will honor him. He can make himself trustworthy, but cannot ensure that others will trust him. He can make himself useful, but cannot ensure that others will employ him. And so, the gentleman is ashamed of not being cultivated; he is not ashamed of being maligned. He is ashamed of not being trustworthy; he is not ashamed of not being trusted. He is ashamed of being incapable; he is not ashamed of not being employed. Thus, he is not tempted by good reputation, nor is he intimidated by slander. He follows the Way as he goes, strictly keeping himself correct, and he does not deviate from it for the sake of material goods. Such a one is called the true gentleman." (Xunzi, 6.15 「士君子之所能不能為:君子能為可貴,不能使人必貴己;能為可信,不能使人必信己;能為可用,不能使人必用己。故君子恥不修,不恥見汙;恥不信,不恥不見信;恥不能,不恥不見用。是以不誘於譽,不恐於誹,率道而行,端然正己,不為物傾側,夫是之謂誠君子。」)

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experience of contacting things that blur personal boundaries. This blurring, according to her, "occurs in relation to both social status and the body – the mouth, the eyes, the ears, and the entire porous surface membrane – all of which is potentially shameful insofar as it is vulnerable to reconstructing." (Geaney 2004, 120) The text Geaney cites, however, does not clearly support her view.

It is clear from this passage that, according to the Confucians, the object of shame should be about how one behaves, rather than about what happens to one. One has the responsibility to act properly according to the situation, and, recall what I mentioned earlier, act with integrity. The virtuous sense of shame is to guide one in one's actions; one's shame is not passive and simply depends on what happens to them, or on situations where they happen to be in, as depicted in the tactile interpretation. Rather, Confucian shame is directed toward the person who acts improperly given the situation. It is this improper action that reflects adversely on the person, not the situation itself. In a way, the tactile interpretation is the opposite extreme of Roetz's autonomy interpretation: the former renders a person too passive and vulnerable to the external world, while the latter focuses too much on self-rule and does not allow room for the influence of externality.

Therefore, rather than thinking that one may be "touched" by a situation out there and be contaminated, I take the relation between a given situation and Confucian shame to be that one may be "involved in" a situation where one becomes tainted due to one's action. This is also my interpretation of Shun's view. According to my interpretation, the situation that one can be "tainted by" is not a situation external to the agent, such as impure substances (dirty water), but a situation that includes one's own action. We often say that one puts oneself in a situation by one's own action. This is how I understand the word "situation" in Shun's view.

It is important to recognize this emphasis on agency (i.e., agent's own involvement and contribution through action) in Confucian shame, and not treat the "tainting situation" to be something that is external to the agent, especially if we remind ourselves that Confucianism makes a crucial move toward humanism in Chinese thought. One of Confucius' great contributions is to provide an understanding of virtue, ren, that is not founded in religion or derived from beliefs about heaven, but in human interaction and proper social relations, which are guided by rituals. Concepts involving impurity and cleanliness likely have played some role in the origin of shame (and are still important in cultures that have a strong religious foundation). There is also no doubt that fame and social images that relate to the possession of material goods are involved in conventional shame. However, Confucians took upon the task to transform original shame and conventional shame into a virtue. Confucian shame, therefore, is no longer about touching something that is unclean, or about not having good social images (such as having fame and material goods), but is about following the Way. One experiences Confucian shame when one puts oneself in a tainting situation, where one does not react properly to the state of the world – when one does not follow the Way.

At this point one may still wonder: what determines whether one's acting is tainting oneself in a given situation according to the Confucians? I mentioned earlier that ritual plays an important role here. Confucians think that the learning and practice of ritual helps people develop a sense of (virtuous) shame; moreover, when respect is shown according to ritual, one keeps far from shame. I have argued (with the help of Roetz and Shun) that rituals need not be external sanctions and can be an internalized norm to manifest the Way, one's moral ideal. In the following I will argue further that consideration of the nature of ritual, however, also reveals another important aspect of Confucian shame (besides the recognition of agency that I just talked about): its openness to otherness.

²⁸ Haidt 2012.

III. Ritual, Confucian Shame, and Otherness

Even though scholars have pointed out that, for the experience of Confucian shame, there need not be actual audience or observer, shame is also described as something one would often feel toward heaven and others. Mencius says,

"The superior man has three things in which he delights, and to be ruler over the kingdom is not one of them. ... That, when looking up, he has no occasion for shame before Heaven, and, below, he has no occasion to blush before men; this is a second delight. ..." (Mencius 7A 20)

From this passage, we can see that not feeling shame before heaven and men is something the superior man strives for, and it counts as something he can be delighted in if achieved. This means, even for the superior men, they feel shame toward heaven and men most of the time – this is why not feeling shame toward heaven and men is an achievement and a kind of delight. However, why would (and should) we feel shame toward heaven and men most of the time?

One short answer may be that heaven and men play an important role in our moral ideal, and since moral ideals entail some form of perfection, it is thus very difficult to achieve – that's why we always feel shame when we think of them. This answer may seem acceptable at the first glance, however, we may then have more questions: what roles do heaven and men play in our moral ideal? Are they just a part of social convention that is external to the self? And, would we really feel shame just because we do not live up to our ideal? As Zahavi (and others) points out, "what is shame-inducing is not the distance from an ideal self but the closeness to an undesired self". (Zahavi 2014:220) Now we need to go back to the Confucian view of rituals and the self to answer these questions.

Earlier I mentioned that ritual is not just a tool of education for the mass, but provides important guidance for anyone who sets their mind on the Way. That is, ritual is not only concerned with social distinctions for a harmonious social life (as Fingarette noted), but it also has a spiritual dimension: it provides an aesthetic understanding about the connection we have with people and the world as a whole. The *Book of Rites* and the *Xunzi* provide good resources to illustrate this point.

The Book of Rites is a core text of the Confucian canon. It is a collection of texts commenting on the meaning and significance of social distinctions, administration, and ceremonial rites of the Zhou dynasty. The texts were written by Confucian scholars at the warring-states period, and the collection is completed in Han dynasty. In this book, we can find three important forms of humanworld connection manifested in ritual practices: a connection with one's origin and one's return with reverence; a connection with family and one's showing filial piety toward parents and ancestors; a connection with all others, and one's showing respect toward the elders and the wise, and care toward everyone. The second and the third connection may be easier to grasp. Here I focus on the first connection – the connection with one's origin.

What is one's origin? Xunzi states it clearly:

"Ritual has three origins. Heaven and Earth are the origin of life. Forefathers and ancestors are the origin of one's kind. Lords and teachers are the origin of order. Without Heaven and Earth, how would one live? Without forefathers and ancestors, how would one have come forth?

Without lords and teachers, how would there be order? If even one of these three origins is neglected, no one will be safe. And so, ritual serves Heaven above and Earth below, it honors forefathers and ancestors, and it exalts lords and teachers. These are the three origins of ritual." (*Xunzi*, 19.4)

Here we can see that, in Xunzi's view, the origins of ritual are also the origins of human and human life: heaven and earth as the origin of life, ancestors as origins of mankind, and lords and teachers as origins of civilization. It is reasonable that the origins of ritual and human are the same, since ritual is meant to guide people to live a flourishing life – it is based on an understanding of what humans are and what they can be. We can also see that recognizing these origins is not the end of the story. Xunzi reminds us that we should not neglect these origins, rather, we should "return" by serving, honoring, and exalting them.

The idea of "return"(回報) involves a feeling and relation of reciprocity. However, this relation is not contractual, and the feeling is not simply "paying back what one owes so we are even". Indeed, one simply cannot have such a relation with one's origins. Rather, we should see it as a kind of humble yet active and responsive attitude in recognition of an authority — an authority to what humans are and to a flourishing life. To understand this attitude, we should notice that there are actually two parts in the ritual toward heaven and earth. According to the Book of Rites, sacrificial rituals were for the purpose of prayer for blessing, or of thanksgiving, or of deprecation. In spring, people pray to heaven for a good year, away from disasters. In winter, people return the blessing by expressing their gratitude toward heaven. In praying, one feels humility and the authority of heaven. In returning, one feels one can express one's gratitude and has something to contribute back. The *Book of Rites* further explains this relation:

The earth supported all things, while heaven hung out its brilliant signs. They derived their material resources from the earth; they derived rules (for their courses of labor) from the heavens. Thus they were led to give honor to heaven and their affection to the earth, and therefore they taught the people to render a good return (to the earth). (The Heads of) families provided (for the sacrifice to it) at the altar in the open court (of their houses); in the kingdom and the states they did so at the She altars; showing how it was the source (of their prosperity). ... When there was such a sacrifice, from the towns, small and large, they contributed their vessels of rice, thereby expressing their gratitude to the source (of their prosperity) and going back in their thoughts to the beginning (of all being). (Jiao Te Sheng 22, 郊特性:「地載萬物,天垂象。取財於地,取法於天,是以尊天而親地也,故教民美報焉。家主中溜而國主社,示本也。... 唯社,丘乘共粢盛,所以報本反始也。」)

Here we can see that ritual not only allows people to feel and express their gratitude toward the origins, but also takes them to reflect on the beginning of life. That is, one is not only thankful for the resources one gets from heaven and earth; more importantly, one is reminded by the ritual practice that heaven and earth is the beginning of life. We are what we are because of them. Because of this strong connection, in a significant way, they are what our lives should answer to.²⁹ This connection with heaven and earth (along with our connection with family and others) figure as a crucial aspect of our self-identity.

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²⁹ Confucius sometimes even talks as if our actions can offend heaven. 子曰:「不然,獲罪於天,無所禱也。」《論語·八佾》

In the beginning of this paper, I mentioned that the origin of the Chinese word xiu 羞 can be understood as a humble yet active and responsive attitude (by making offerings, appearement, and/or motivation to correct oneself to maintain one's social image) in recognition of an authority. Here we see that, for Confucians, this authority includes heaven and earth, our ancestors, lords and teachers, and others. When Mencius said that the superior men is delighted in not feeling shame when facing heaven and people, it is because heaven and people are part of the authority to which our lives should answer to - they are the origins and the beginning to our existence. They are not identical to us, rather, they are the otherness to which we are (and should be) open to. It is said that Confucius does not speak very much about Ways of heaven.³⁰ Xunzi, on the other hand, is very clear about the distinction between heaven and men (天人之分) – humans should not try to figure out how heaven works, that is trying to compete with heaven in its work.³¹ For Xunzi, the Way of human is not the Way of heaven; at the same time, the flourishing life he aspires to is provided by heaven and completed by men (天生人成). When we come in contact with this otherness, we may feel a lack in ourselves. This may be because we feel the lack of power and feel the need to ask for help or pray for blessings.³² More importantly, we may feel that we do not answer to these authorities sufficiently – we do not live a life that fulfills the return that is part of our reciprocal relation with heaven and people. In this sense, Confucian shame is a feeling of lack when one is in contact with otherness.

Consideration of the two parts of sacrificial ritual, praying and returning, sheds light on Confucian shame. Tang Junyi made an inspiring comment: "The emphasis on asking is to cultivate one's humility in front of God; the emphasis on returning, on the other hand, reveals that even though the blessings are great, we can still return with sincerity and reverence, which helps reduce the feeling of shame. When people show sincerity and reverence in front of God, they at the same time establish their moral awareness of the self and potential dignity, and no longer feel the great distance between heaven and men. Therefore, the emphasis on returning itself is a spiritual consciousness that renders the God-human relation more moderate, by elevating human to become closer to God, and reducing the transcendence of God." 33 Tang points out, I think convincingly, that the practice of ritual on the one hand cultivates in us humility, on the other hand, it elevates us by the fact that once we return with sincerity and reverence, the feeling of shame subsides. Indeed, understood in this way, one opposition to Confucian shame is not pride, but a form of reverence (jin 敬), the most crucial attitude in the practice of ritual.³⁴ It should be clear now Confucian shame involves our own attitudes and our reactions in the face of authority and otherness. It is our attitude and reaction that changes our relation with authority and our feelings about otherness. Confucian shame is a feeling of lack with regard to agency.

30子貢曰:「夫子之文章,可得而聞也;夫子之言性與天道,不可得而聞也。」《論語:公冶長》

³¹ Xunzi 17.2.

³² This echoes Williams's view about shame: "It may seem mysterious how any process of internalization can explain shame. The answer lies in the fact that the root of shame lies not so much in observed nakedness itself, but in something of which that is, in most cultures but not all, a powerful expression ... The root of shame lies in exposure in a more general sense, in being at a disadvantage: in what I shall call, in a very general sense, a loss of power." (Shame and Necessity 78) 33 Tang Junyi, 〈論中國原始宗教信仰與儒家天道觀之關係兼釋中國哲學之起源〉,胡適等著《中國哲學思想論集:總論篇》, p179 with my translation.

³⁴ Book of Rites: Of all the methods for the good ordering of men, there is none more urgent than the use of ceremonies. Ceremonies are of five kinds, and there is none of them more important than sacrifices. (Ji Tong) For visitors and guests the principal thing was a courteous humility; at sacrifices, reverence. (Shao Yi)

Conclusion

Confucian shame, as suggested by my agent-contact model, results from a feeling of lack with regard to agency through contact with otherness. This otherness includes other people and the world as a whole, and constitute the origin and the beginning of our existence. Confucian shame is a cultivated virtue through learning and ritual practices. The fact that the early Confucians think that we are (and should be) able to feel shame in this way tells us their notion of the self, and how it can (and should) relate to the world through cultivation. Heaven and earth, our ancestors, teachers, and others are all origins to our existence, and we are to be understood in relation to them. They play a crucial part in our self-identity. It is through learning and ritual practices we can have proper relations with them, and keep on the path of the Way. At some point, one may feel no Confucian shame toward otherness and takes delight in it. This is not because one has finally achieved perfection — that is a goal of infinity; rather, it is because one knows that, at this point, one has done all that one can with the attitude of reverence. This is Confucian humanism.

*** Conference paper – please do not cite or circulate. Thank you. ***

³⁵ 子夏曰:「... 死生有命,富貴在天。君子敬而無失,與人恭而有禮...」《論語:顏淵》